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 This thesis aims to reevaluate theories of the spectatorial gaze in light of films that 
feature transgender characters.  Such theories, in particular those of Laura Mulvey, Mary 
Ann Doane, and Teresa de Lauretis, rely on strict sex and gender binaries to explain the 
pleasure that comes from watching films.  However, transgender characters disrupt such 
binaries and allow for new ways of seeing.  Using feminist theories of sex and gender, 
most notably Judith Butler’s theory of gender performativity, queer theory and feminist 
theories of spectatorship, this thesis explores the effects of the transgender character on 
film spectators by providing close readings of The Birdcage, Victor/Victoria, 
Transamerica, and Boys Don’t Cry. 
 The Birdcage explores the key tension between the reification and subversion of 
stereotypes inherent in drag performance, and Armand and Albert’s gender performances 
allow for a spectatorial position that is individualized rather than determined by the sex 
and gender of the spectator.  Although Victor/Victoria contains elements of gender 
transgression through its exposure of gender as a performance and its disruption of the 
spectatorial gaze, King and Victoria’s relationship undermines the radical potential of the 
film by reinscribing Victoria as a vulnerable, submissive woman.  By foregrounding the 
spectatorial gaze and reworking the Oedipal scenario, Transamerica ultimately argues 
that the borders of male/female, masculine/feminine, and mother/father are false 
dichotomies.  Finally, although Lana’s understanding of and relationship with/to 
Brandon’s body fluctuates throughout the film, Boys Don’t Cry ultimately preserves the 
complexity of the transgender body through Lana’s gaze.  Such findings call for further 


















A View of the Hallway: Spectatorship and the Transgender Character 
 
“There’s a lovely saying that one door closes and another  
door opens but it’s hell in the hallway. . . That’s something I think 
 a lot about.  Being trans, you’re in the hallway. . . But if you stay in the  
hallway, which I believe is much more freeing because you’re not bound  
by either side, it’s infinitely harder because you’re not bound by  
either side but you’re not belonging to either side.   
The hallway is a wonderful place.”  
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Chapter One 
A Theoretical Introduction to Sex, Gender, and Spectatorship 
Sex and Gender: A Brief Overview 
Gender studies as we know it today is a young intellectual project, and only in the 
past one hundred years or so have we had a discourse with which to speak critically about 
perhaps the most common markers of human identity: sex and gender.  The history of the 
terms and the debates that surround those histories are complex and cannot adequately be 
addressed in such a short space as I am providing them here.  This chapter, however, 
attempts to lay out the theoretical framework on which I will build my analyses of the 
films in the following chapters.  I begin with a brief history of feminist theory’s 
distinction between sex and gender that spawned gender studies, leading to Judith 
Butler’s theory of gender as a performance.  Butler’s theory transitions seamlessly into a 
discussion of critical readings of drag performance and cross-dressing, the central theme 
of both The Birdcage and Victor/Victoria.  I will discuss the potential of drag both to 
foreground the performative aspects of gender and to reinforce stereotypes of femininity.  
I will then explore the more complex and contentious world of transsexuals and 
transgender people.  I will discuss the heated debates within the GLBT community about 
these two categories, which inform my analyses of Transamerica and Boys Don’t Cry. 
These categories of sex, gender, drag and transgender are not easy to define, nor 
do they describe clearly delineated behaviors or beliefs.  Perhaps quite obviously, these 
marginal categories that theorists have created to describe people who force us to 
question the established categories of male and female, masculine and feminine, do not 
adequately contain them.  In The Birdcage, for example, Albert is a stage drag performer 
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but also expresses feminine characteristics in his clothing and behavior in his personal 
life.  What is he, then?  A homosexual drag queen?  A cross-dresser?  A transperson?  
And what of Brandon in Boys Don’t Cry?  He self-identifies as a boy and has been 
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, but only once mentions sexual reassignment 
surgery and discounts it due to his economic status.  Is he transgender or a pre-operative 
transsexual?  It is nearly impossible to say as there is often little ideological consensus 
about gender identity among those within these prescribed categories, and the categories 
themselves can be essentializing and may fail to account for the range of identities that 
they purport to contain.  As such, I will attempt to define the categories as best as 
possible, sketching general features that are both followed and undermined by the 
characters in the films. 
The reformulation of the definition of “gender” was and continues to be central to 
modern debates about sex, sexuality and identity.  As Linda Nicholson points out in her 
brief overview of the history of gender, “prior to the late 1960s, English language-
speakers [most commonly] used the word ‘gender’ to refer to the understanding of certain 
words as masculine or feminine.”
2
 Gender was a linguistic term that described 
characteristics of words, not characteristics of human beings.  However, feminists 
appropriated the term and made a distinction between sex and gender as separate criteria 
that differentiated men and women.  Sex came to describe “the biological” distinction 
used to describe physical differences between males and females, while gender referred 
to “the social” distinction between masculinity and femininity that describes differing 
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modes of conduct that are imposed upon the sexes by societal norms.
3
  By separating the 
biological from the social, feminists and, later, gender theorists, were able to argue that 
behaviors and abilities ascribed to the sexes were not natural but socially constructed, 
thus providing a way to begin to break free from oppressive, heteronormative patriarchal 
expectations.  
The social constructionist theory of sex and gender was first articulated in Simone 
de Beauvoir’s book, The Second Sex.  Beauvoir famously asserted, “One is not born a 
woman, one becomes one.”
4
  This was the first time feminist theory addressed the idea 
that there was a distinction between the natural (the way one is born) and the social (the 
way one comes to act or be a certain way).  Beauvoir goes on to say that the body, or 
biological sex, “is not enough to define [a] woman; there is no true living reality except 
as manifested by the conscious individual through activities and in the bosom of a 
society.”
5
  She asserts that perceived reality is merely a social construct, and gender is 
part of this “reality.” 
Later feminist theorists such as Kate Millet pushed Beauvoir’s ideas further, 
affirming feminism’s adoption of gender as social construct.  Millet asserts that men and 
women become gendered beings because their “life experiences” render them subjects of 
two entirely different “cultures.”
6
  She goes on to say, “Implicit in all the gender identity 
development which takes place through childhood is the sum total of the parents’, the 
peers’, and the culture’s notions of what is appropriate to each gender by way of 
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temperament, character, interests, status, worth, gesture, and expression.”
7
  In other 
words, women “become” feminine and men “become” masculine because, as they grow 
up, society attaches significance to their sexed bodies, and their physical anatomy elicits 
specific societal expectations about behavior.  Society’s differing expectations for and 
treatment of men and women render them members of different cultures, which results in 
the development of masculine or feminine gendered identities.  
Nancy Chodorow continues in this social constructionist vein but argues from a 
psychoanalytic perspective, narrowing the focus of the theory to a child’s relationship 
with his or her parents.  In our society, parenting is primarily the job of the mother. All 
children, male and female, “have a sense of oneness with” the mother as newborns, and 
“a child’s earliest experience…is usually of identity with and attachment to a single 
mother” because of her active role in their lives.
8
  However, this “oneness” with the 
mother must eventually fade as the child grows and develops “an individuated sense of 
self” and, as Millet would argue, the way in which the child develops this sense of self is 
based on his or her sex and the associated gender identity assigned at birth.
9
  Chodorow 
argues that mothers are “more likely to identify with a daughter than with a son,” and this 
identification is reciprocated; girls see that they are like their mothers just as mothers see 
that their daughters are like them.
10
 Because the mother behaves as though she and her 
daughter are alike, the daughter believes she is like her mother and mimics her behavior 
and temperament.  However, male children have a different experience.  A mother sees 
her son as different and separate from herself, “emphasizing his masculinity in opposition 
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to herself and…pushing him to assume, or acquiescing in his assumption of, a sexually 
toned male-role relation to her.”
11
  For a daughter, the sense of identification continues as 
she grows older and develops her gender identity because the mother is female and, 
presumably, “feminine.”  But a son develops his gender identity in terms of 
differentiation from the mother.  Unconsciously, he sees that he is not (physically) like 
the mother and must separate his identity from her because he is not female so his 
identity cannot be feminine. 
Although the social constructionist theory revolutionized modern feminist 
thinking, not all feminist theorists agree that it is accurate or helpful in articulating 
women’s lived experiences.  Sally Haslanger argues that, if one thinks “there is no reality 
independent of our practices or of our language and that ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ are only 
fictions employed by the dominant to mask their power,” women and other marginalized 
figures are rendered powerless in the fight against patriarchy and oppression because it is 
impossible to fight something that is not real.
12
  She seeks to distinguish between the 
belief that the world is socially constructed and the belief that the way we see the world is 
socially constructed.  Haslanger writes, “It may well be that our point of view on the 
world is always socially conditioned; but there is no reason to conclude that the world we 
have a point of view on is likewise socially conditioned.”
13
  We believe gender is not 
“real” because it is not natural but rather a product of social expectations, but this does 
not mean that gender does not exist.  In the ways in which it affects the daily lives of 
women living in patriarchal societies, it is very real.  By arguing that gender is purely a 
social construct that exists only in our minds, we paradoxically render it untouchable.  As 
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Haslanger notes, “a change in my thinking, by itself, cannot make my body, my friends, 
or my neighborhood go out of existence…To bring about change in the world, you have 
to do more than just think about it.”
14
  Although Haslanger agrees that gender is not 
biologically determined, she believes that feminist theory needs to acknowledge the 
reality of gender and its tangible effects in the “real” world. 
 Additionally, some feminist theorists find fault with the social constructionist 
theory because, ironically, it is essentializing. When theorists like Millet argue that 
women exist in one culture while men exist in another, she implies that all women have 
shared experiences that force them into the same or similar types of femininity.  The 
experiences of an upper-class white woman would, however, be vastly different from the 
experiences of a lower-income Hispanic woman.  The “culture” of the female/femininity 
glosses over the many distinctions within those categories and creates a false impression 
of homogeneity.  Many contemporary feminist theorists are concerned with issues within 
the feminist community that have largely been ignored because of the perception that 
experience is shared across lines of class and/or ethnicity based on shared sex and/or 
gender.   Linda Nicholson argues that we cannot view women as having fully shared 
experiences, but neither can we believe that they have nothing in common.  Instead “we 
can see [the male/female] as encompassing a complex web of distinctions evidencing 
threads of overlap within a field of discontinuities” and can create a theory of gender that 
addresses the differing experiences of women across culture.
15
   
These seemingly conflicting views of gender are reconciled by Judith Butler’s 
theory of gender.  Butler begins her discussion of social constructionism at its genesis by 
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examining Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex, investigating concepts that will ground her 
later work in Gender Trouble, Bodies that Matter and Undoing Gender.  She states that, 
by arguing “one is not born, but rather becomes a woman,” Beauvoir is privileging sex 
and the body, identifying them as primary and thus natural.  However, Butler asks, “how 
are we to find the body that preexists cultural interpretations?”
16
  She argues that the 
body is always already culturally constructed because sex is itself a gendered category 
organized on the basis of culturally-conditioned perceptions of masculine and feminine 
physical characteristics.  Because our cultures choose to group humans based on sexual 
characteristics, we are always already gendered; there is no preexisting body that we can 
view outside of the gender binary.  Butler thus exposes Beauvoir’s view of social 
construction as one of paradox and false hope.  By denaturalizing gender and casting it as 
something that one becomes, as the social force through which women are culturally 
disenfranchised, Beauvoir implies that gender is not a given but a fluid condition – one 
that we choose to embody – opening up a space for to challenge the culture of patriarchal 
oppression.  Butler, anticipating ideas she discusses in Bodies that Matter and Undoing 
Gender, argues that “one chooses ones gender, but one does not choose it from a 
distance.”
17
  Social viability requires “an unambiguous gender affinity;” thus “it is not 
possible to exist in a socially meaningful sense outside of established gender norms.”
18
  If 
there is life outside of normative gender, if we can choose to become a different gender, 
we fall outside of social expectations and are thus rendered a non-existent Other. 
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Butler examines these ideas more fully in Gender Trouble.  She repeats her earlier 
ideas with more clarity, arguing that it makes “no sense…to define gender as the cultural 
interpretation of sex, if sex itself is a gendered category.”
19
  In other words, the 
description of our bodies as “male” or “female” is based upon notions of how masculinity 
and femininity present themselves physically, which Butler calls our gendered 
appearance.  Saying that sex is natural and gender is cultural situates sex as 
“prediscursive,” and “the binary frame for sex is effectively secured” because we ignore 
the fact that our ideas of sex are based upon our ideas of gender.
20
  According to Butler, 
the distinction between sex and gender ultimately reifies the power of both categories.  
As an alternative, she proposes a reformulation of gender that avoids conceiving of sex as 




 She elaborates her ideas concerning the construction of gender in a later article, 
“Performative Acts and Gender Constitution.”  In this article, Butler explains gender as 
“a performative accomplishment which the mundane social audience, including the actors 
themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of belief.”
22
  Performance is the 
key to Butler’s view of gender, and she defines performance as “the stylized repetition of 
acts through time.”
23
  Our gendered selves are socially constructed not only because of 
our divergent life experiences, as Millet proposes; our divergent life experiences, rather, 
are socially constructed by the different performances we must enact because of societal 
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expectations. Furthermore, as Nancy Chodorow claims, we learn these performances by 
seeing other members of our culture, such as our parents, perform gender roles and 
embody gendered identities.  In other words, societal expectations of men and women 
coerce their respective masculine and feminine performances.  Furthermore, because men 
must perform masculinity and women must perform femininity, these different acts 
produce different life experiences.  Because societal expectations both create and reflect 
normative gender performances, gender conceals its genesis and is thus naturalized.   
 Butler confronts not only the construction of gender but also the social 
construction of the body in Gender Trouble and “Imitation and Gender Subordination,” 
an article published the same year.  She argues not only that there is no prediscursive sex, 
but that the body itself exists and is intelligible only through language.  It is constructed 
through a “discourse that establishes the boundaries of the body [for] the purpose of 
instating and naturalizing certain taboos regarding appropriate limits, postures, and 
modes of exchange that define what it is that constitutes bodies.”
24
  These boundaries, 
however, are permeable because our bodies are not closed systems.  We have orifices 
where the boundaries of our bodies break down, clouding the lines between self and 
Other.  Butler alleges that improper uses of the body that foreground the permeability of 
these boundaries, such as homosexual relations among men, panic society not only 
because they expose the vulnerability of the body but because they show the vulnerability 
and instability of hegemonic society itself.  These sexual practices “effectively reinscribe 
the boundaries of the body along new cultural lines.”
25
  Fearing the loss of perceived 
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stability of the subject and of the body, society devalues these reinscriptions as taboo and 
insists that bodies that engage in these abnormal practices are not bodies at all. 
Butler continues by speaking more specifically about the construction of the body 
as sexed.  Because we are separated into categories of male or female according to the 
appearance of our sexual organs, we are classified by reproductive capabilities.  Men and 
women are then expected to pair off and reproduce, resulting in what Butler and other 
feminist theorists call compulsory heterosexuality.  In this manner, sex itself emerges as a 
performance mandated by heterosexual norms, and “the very categories of sex, of sexual 
identity, of gender are produced or maintained in the effects of this compulsory 
performance.”
26
  Thus, humans are “disingenuously lined up within a causal or 
expressive sequence that the heterosexual norm produces to legitimate itself as the origin 
of all sex.”
27
  Butler claims that the key to “expos[ing] the causal lines as retrospectively 
and performatively produced fabrications” is to foreground the performative aspect of 
both sex and gender.
28
  The main site of this exposure and resultant decoupling of sex and 
gender can be found in the lived experiences of transpeople. 
As we delve into the theory and practice of transgender, we come across slippery 
terms that are often difficult to define adequately.  The term transgender has two 
meanings.  The first of these definitions is used to describe a range of identities and 
behaviors that undermine traditional heteronormative conceptions of sex and gender.  
Among these are drag/cross-dressing, transsexuality and transgender.  In the following 
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sections I describe the definitions, functions and implications of each of these 
subcategories, focusing on their displacement of sex and gender. 
 
Drag: Foregrounding Gender as Performative 
In its strictest definition, drag performance is the enactment of a gender that is 
incongruous with one’s anatomical sex in order to entertain an audience.  We see this 
both in The Birdcage, when Albert performs as Starina, and in the multiple performances 
in Victor/Victoria.  The performance of the typical drag queen involves a man performing 
as a woman, dressing and behaving in an often grotesquely exaggerated feminine manner 
with heavy makeup, perfectly coiffed hair and extremely feminine clothing such as ball 
gowns.  Although women also perform as drag kings, miming and performing 
masculinity, my discussion will restrict itself to drag queens, as male performance in drag 
is more relevant to the films I analyze.  According to performance theorist Jill Dolan, 
stage performances such as drag bring people together “to see people perform live, 
hoping, perhaps, for moments of transformation that might let them reconsider and 
change the world outside the theatre, from its macro to its micro arrangements” by 
modeling “new ideas about how to be and how to be with each other.”
29
  In other words, 
drag performance can provide a new template for conceptualizing and enacting sex and 
gender. 
In Bodies that Matter, Butler is one of the first to identify drag as a site for the 
potential redefinition of gender roles because of its exposure of gender as a performed 
role.  She explains that drag is “a site of a certain ambivalence, one which reflects the 
more general situation of being implicated in the regimes of power by which one is 
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  Drag performers “reverse and displace [the] originating aims” of 
compulsory gender performance, undermining the supposed “uniformity of the subject” 
by performing the typically incongruous male sex and feminine gender.
31
  These 
incongruent performances, which Butler calls instances of “disobedience,” generate a 
“refusal of the law in the form of the parodic inhabiting of conformity…subtly call[ing] 
into question the legitimacy of the command.”
32
  In other words, drag performers expose 




Many other critics have examined the function and effects of drag performance, 
expanding on Butler’s work.  Most agree that drag performance has positive effects both 
on the audience and the performers themselves.  For example, in his study of drag, Keith 
McNeal describes the benefits of drag performance for its mostly gay audience and 
performers, arguing that drag is a “ritually sanctioned performance genre in which gay 
men can safely gather to watch, explore, and participate in symbolic transformations of 
gender ambivalence in the psychocultural arena of the show.”
34
  For McNeal, drag 
performance is cathartic and releases tension for the gay community because it provides a 
space in which “the ‘femininity’ attributed to gay men is not stigmatized and shamed but 
asserts control, retaliating against a hegemonic straight world.”
35
  In other words, drag 
performance inverts the binary of masculine/feminine and allows the gay community to 
reclaim power by rebelling against the heteronormative culture assigns them to the 
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marginalize category of the feminine and, in the process, coming together and forming a 
community.  Indeed, McNeal asserts that “drag is a subculturally constituted defense 
(Kaplan 1991; Obeyesekere 1990a; Spiro 1961, 1994a) in which gay men vicariously and 
ambivalently participate in the gendered drama presupposed by the hetero-normative 
model of gender and sexuality.”
36
  Thus, drag allows for a simultaneous participation in 
and critique of heteronormative definitions of sex and gender.  
In her case study, Eve Shapiro comes to similar conclusions and supports Dolan’s 
contention that these performances can be transformational, not only for the audience but 
for the performers as well.  Shapiro asserts that “drag performances cannot be understood 
without viewing drag as a gendered process, in which the performance itself…often 
transforms the gender identity and politics of the drag performer.”
37
  In other words, drag 
is a special kind of performance that is often purposefully ideologically motivated, and 
that motivation make the minds not only of the audience but also of the performers 
receptive to more open ideas of gender.  She contends, “drag is not simply an expression 
of performers' preformed oppositional gender politics or preexisting counterhegemonic 
gender identities.”
38
  The performance is more complex than that; “the process of 
participating in drag communities may also function as a form of consciousness and a site 
of transformation for performers.”
39
  She goes on to interview many drag performers, all 
of whom describe the liberation they feel as a result of their performances.  They say that 
“participating in [drag] opened up a previously unavailable space to question gender” and 
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showed them that “gender identity [is] socially constructed and mutable.”
40
  McNeal’s 
and Shapiro’s studies show that drag, through its performance of exaggerated gender 
stereotypes in a communal setting, fulfills societal needs in the lives of gay men and 
allows them to question and reconstitute gender roles.  As Butler contends, drag has the 
power to help people break out of stultifying definitions of sex and gender. 
 There are, however, also problematic aspects of gender performance.  In her 
pioneering study, Judith Butler acknowledges that drag is controversial and contentious, 
explaining that drag performers enact traditional, mainstream, heterosexual femininity.  
As such, their performances have the potential not to question but rather to reify 
traditional gender roles, making them more fixed than ever before by acknowledging and 
cementing, through their performance of specific traits, an essentialized conception of 
women.  In her study of drag culture, Roberta Mock concludes that drag performance 
reifies the dominant ideology because the audience often “laugh[s] at, rather than with” 
the performer and the role being performed by the drag artist.
41
  The laughter is 
authorized by the audience’s (and performer’s) knowledge that the role is not the 
performer’s “true” identity.  In this manner, the “performance may act as a 'safety valve'-
ultimately, a disincentive towards change in the social sphere and the recuperation of 
absent authority.”
42
  In other words, the performance is not transformative but merely a 
spectacle that reaffirms the social norms that are only apparently transgressed.  The 
audience sees the drag performer as a joke rather than as subversive, affirming rather than 
interrogating gender roles.  McNeal also questions the transformative power of drag.  
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While he admits that “drag's marginal play problematizes cultural categories,” which 
allows us to appreciate its parody and subversion as an ‘art of resistance,’” he warns that 
we “should not confuse ritualized catharsis with resistance or subversion.”
43
  Although 
drag performance shows that gender is performative by parodying it, drag does not 
necessarily push back against gender stereotypes.  These three major aspects of drag 
performance – its ability to cause the audience to question gender, its transformative 
power over the performer, and its potential to reify traditional gender norms through the 
performance of stereotypical femininity –take center stage The Birdcage and 
Victor/Victoria. 
 
Transsexual and Transgender Identities: Embodied Performance 
 Another complex site at which normative sex and gender binaries break down is in 
the lived experiences of transpeople.  Transpeople, even more than drag performers, 
show the inadequacy of the sex and gender categories available to us.  People who are 
transgender, as Butler explains, are “at the limits of intelligibility” and display sex and 
gender characteristics outside of the binaries of male/female and masculine/feminine.
44
  
Because the continuum among transpeople cannot be crudely broken down without 
substituting one set of oversimplified categories for another, I will attempt to discuss in 
detail a range of experiences of transsexuals and transgendered people. 
 Transsexuals are people who identify more strongly with different sex and gender 
categories from those they are given at birth.  This often results in the feeling that one is 
in the “wrong body,” and these individuals often seek stable placement into the opposite 
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   As a result of this discomfort in their bodies, transsexuals often seek 
sexual reassignment surgery, commonly referred to as SRS, in which doctors surgically 
remove the penis and construct a vagina or vice versa.  The sense of disconnection 
between interiority (personality, behaviors, traits, feelings, etc.) and exteriority (the body) 
is a defining feature of transsexuality.  As transgender theorist Christopher Shelley 
explains, transsexuals often cling strongly to “their sense of, or desire for, embodied 
integrity” and seek to feel that their bodies outwardly express the way they feel about and 
see themselves, and they often wish to “disappear into the world to live straight lives” 
after their surgeries.
46
  Even though transsexuals are a serious threat to heteronormative 
views on sex and gender because they expose the fact that biological sex is not always an 
indicator of gender identity, many are “more motivated to maintain the gender binary 
than to blur it” and are “happy to remain within binary gender and sexuality norms.”
47
  
The result, from an ideological perspective, is a paradox: a deep subversion of the 
stability of sex and gender in an attempt to acquire and maintain a stable sex and gender. 
 In Undoing Gender, Judith Butler examines the concept of stability in relation to 
transsexuals.  In order for a psychologist or psychiatrist to approve SRS for someone, the 
individual must be diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, or GID.  The diagnosis, 
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), requires 
that one display “persistent discomfort” with one’s sex, which “establish[es] that gender 
is a relatively permanent phenomenon” in the eyes of the American Psychiatric 
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  Butler identifies the diagnosis as problematic for several reasons.  She 
explains that, while “the diagnosis continues to be valued because it facilitates an 
economically feasible way of transitioning,” it also “continues to pathologize as a mental 
disorder what ought to be understood instead as one among many possibilities of 
determining one’s gender for oneself.”
49
  A diagnosis is required for medical insurance 
companies to pay for SRS, but that diagnosis requires at least a tacit admission that one is 
mentally ill.  Additionally, in accordance with her theory of gender as performative, 
Butler and many other gender theorists reject the view that gender identity is permanent, 
and Butler contends that there could be reasons other than “persistent discomfort” with 
one’s anatomy that cause one to consider SRS, such as the realization that there are other 
life choices available as a result of a shift in ideological perspective.
50
  Furthermore, 
those who desire SRS must “[learn] how to present [them]sel[ves] in a discourse that is 
not [theirs]” and “conform to the language of the diagnosis.”
51
  In other words, even if 
one does not perfectly fit the symptomology of GID, one must work the system, speaking 
and behaving as though he or she indeed qualifies for a diagnosis.  As a result of this 
paradoxical relation to the stability of sex and gender, transsexuality is a site at which we 
can examine the construction and embodiment of gender and the ways in which the 
binary categories of male/female and masculine/feminine are reified and challenged.  The 
complex relationship transsexuals have with sex and gender will inform my later 
examinations of Transamerica and Boys Don’t Cry. 
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 Unlike transsexuals, who tend towards a desire to stay within the binary 
framework, transgendered people often consciously work against the binary.  For various 
reasons, both economic and ideological, those who are transgendered often choose not to 
have a full sexual reassignment surgery.  Some will elect to make changes to their bodies, 
such as the addition or removal of breasts or the consumption of testosterone or estrogen, 
but they may not to opt for genital surgery.  As a result, many transgendered bodies do 
not adhere to normative definitions of sex, as they combine anatomical characteristics 
both male and female.  This may be a deliberate decision on the part of transgendered 
people who “consciously [work] to challenge [binary gender and sexuality norms] 
through negotiation within their intimate partnerships, and through their dealings with 
medicine, the law and social others.”
52
  Just as their bodies are amalgamations of male 
and female, their personalities, behaviors and modes of dress also tend to resist rigid 
categorization.  Some choose to live as one gender, but others choose androgyny or 
switch their gender presentation from day to day.  Many transgender people purposefully 
buck the norm in order to try to open a space that is neither rigidly male nor female nor 
masculine nor feminine, working as “activists” who revel in and “privilege the crossing 
and fluidity of queer.”
53
  This gray area, the non-space between male and female and 
masculine and feminine, will play a key role in my later analyses. 
 Examinations of transgender identities and sexualities have led theorists to desire 
more open, inclusive definitions of what those terms mean.  Critics such as Gayle 
Salamon, channeling Merleau-Ponty, argue for a conceptualization of sexuality and the 
body that does not rely on supposedly stable, fixed criteria such as genitalia.  Instead 
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Salamon argues that love, desire and sexuality create embodiment and that we are 
“brought into being by desire or love…only becom[ing] bound to [an]other through 
‘desire or love,’ and through that relation of desire or love the other comes to exist for me 
as a thing or being.”
54
  No pre-existing body determines relations among people; instead, 
our desire and love for others creates our selves as we know them.  These notions give 
rise to an individualized account of gender, sex and sexuality by explaining “that 
phenomenological experiences of the body and the subject are individual rather than 
categorical,” and Salamon continues by asserting “neither sexual embodiment nor 
situatedness nor expression can be predicted by membership in any particular category of 
gender or sex.”
55
  Salamon goes beyond disconnecting sex and gender to explode those 
categories altogether by explaining that, just as love and desire are individualized, just as 
those experiences change from person to person, so too do sex and gender identities shift 




Gender in Film: Theories of the Spectatorial Gaze 
Since the publication of Laura Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure in Narrative Cinema” 
in 1975, much of film theory concerning gender has focused on the concept of the gaze. 
Drawing on Freudian psychoanalysis, Mulvey explains that our pleasure in watching 
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films emanates from our “scopophilia,” or pleasure in looking.
56
  For Freud, scopophilia 
was associated with “taking other people as objects, subjecting them to a controlling and 
curious gaze.”
57
  This active, controlling gaze is that of the male, the “maker of 
meaning,” and is directed onto the female figure, “the bearer of meaning.”
58
  Because the 
audience watches the film but the characters on screen cannot look back, films have a 
voyeuristic appeal as the audience feel as though they are “looking in on a private 
world.”
59
  Therefore, the spectator, regardless of sex, assumes the position of the male, 
the controller of the gaze, taking the action on screen as its object.  In addition to its 
voyeuristic appeal, the cinema also appeals to the spectator’s narcissistic identification 
with the subject on screen.  In this way, the act of watching films reenacts the mirror 
phase in which a child sees and recognizes his or her own image in the mirror.  This 
recognition, or misrecognition, as the child [mis]takes the image for the self, is integral to 
the construction of the subject, just as the “cinema has distinguished itself in the 
production of ego ideals” and sources of identification for audiences.
60
   
Mulvey continues by discussing the female figure in particular and its 
construction in the cinema.  She explains that the female figure is fetishized.  In order to 
assuage castration anxiety, the source of that anxiety, the woman’s body, becomes the 
fetish, the stand-in phallus.  The glamorous Hollywood starlet is thus continually 
“displayed as sexual object,” generating pleasure by “play[ing] to and signif[ying] male 
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  Thus “cinema builds the way [the female] is to be looked at into the spectacle 
itself,” and that spectacle is two-fold: she is both an “erotic object for the characters 
within the screen story, and [an] erotic object for the spectator within the auditorium.”
62
  
As in the case of the voyeuristic gaze, fetishization is a distinctly male practice as only 
the male experiences castration anxiety.  As a result, all audience members are required 
to see as a man and to identify with the male gaze of the characters within the film in 
order to experience pleasure.  
Since the publication of Mulvey’s article, feminist theorists have sought to extend 
and revise her argument.  Much of the discussion has centered on the conundrum of the 
female spectator.  Given the rigid boundaries of spectatorship Mulvey describes, the 
female spectator is disavowed and has, literally, no point of view available to her.  In 
attempting to define and work out the problem of the female spectator, critics such as 
Mary Ann Doane have explained that the female is “too close to herself, entangled in her 
own enigma” to achieve the distance required for scopophilia because “she is the 
image.”
63
  This lack of distance between self and image results in an “overidentification 
with the image,” an “inability to fetishize,” which inhibits the erotic quality of the look 
Mulvey describes.
64
  Consequently, there is “a blockage at the level of theory;” the 
female spectator does not theoretically exist, or exists far too problematically.
65
  As 
Teresa de Lauretis notes, in Mulvey’s conception of the gaze female spectators are only 
allowed “the position of the mythical obstacle, monster or landscape” that the male 
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  “How,” she asks, “can the female spectator be entertained as 
the subject of the very movement that places her as its object, that makes her the figure of 
its own closure?”
67
  There is no place for an active female spectator in Mulvey’s 
conceptualization of spectatorship because she is not a subject; she is a blind, passive 
object of the gaze, just like the film itself. 
Despite these obstacles and “blockages” in conceptualization, feminist critics 
have labored to discover and describe the female spectator.  Mary Ann Doane explains 
the basic conclusion that theorists have drawn: when experiencing a film, “the female 
spectator has basically two modes of entry:  a narcissistic identification with the female 
figure as spectacle and a ‘transvestite’ identification with the active male hero in his 
mastery.”
68
  In other words, the female spectator can passively identify with the female 
on screen, masochistically deriving pleasure in her vicarious objectification, or she can 
identify with the prescribed spectatorial position, that of the male gaze that identifies with 
the male hero.  Here the theories of transgender and the gaze meet: the majority of 
theorists conceptualize this “slippage” or “oscillation” or “alternation” between gendered 
subject positions in the same terms as those used to describe transgendered people.  
Doane uses the metaphors of the “transvestite,” the use of gender as a “masquerade,” and 
the “hermaphrodite.”
69
  Mulvey, in a reexamination of her earlier ideas, speaks of the 
female spectator’s tendency toward “trans-sex identification” and “oscillations in sexual 
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  Like cross-dressers, atypically-sexed peoples and conscious gender 
performers, the female spectator cannot unproblematically adhere to the feminine side of 
the binary.  Teresa de Lauretis describes the female spectator as “alternati[ng]” between 
masculinity and femininity, emphasizing the instability of gender by explaining that the 
terms “do not refer so much to qualities or states of being inherent in a person” but “to 
positions which [one] occupies in relation to desire.  They are terms of identification.”
71
  
Utilizing language that recalls Salamon’s discussion of individualized gender, sex and 
sexuality, de Lauretis emphasizes the role of the female spectator’s subject position in 
calling rigid binary categories into question. 
As a result of the problematics of theorizing the female spectator, critics have 
called for a different kind of cinema, one that could dislocate the modes of pleasure that 
rely on the objectification and disenfranchisement of the woman.  Mulvey calls for a less 
immersive cinema that disrupts traditional narrativity and continuity editing in order to 
disrupt the voyeuristic and scopophilic appeal of film, with which she experimented in 
the film Riddles of the Sphinx.  E. Ann Kaplan argues for a similar dismantling of 
traditional narrative cinema, recommending that feminist filmmakers “forc[e] our gaze to 
dwell on the images by slowing down or stopping the projection that creates patriarchal 
voyeurism [so that] we may be able to provide a ‘reading against the grain’ that will give 
us information about our positioning as spectators.”
72
 
More recently critics such as de Lauretis suggest that that “the most exciting work 
in cinema and in feminism today is not anti-narrative or anti-Oedipal; quite the 
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  She argues instead that “it is narrative and Oedipal with a vengeance, for it 
seeks to stress the duplicity of that scenario and the specific contradiction of the female 
subject in it, the contradiction by which historical women must work with and against 
Oedipus.”
74
  In other words, these films seek to reflect on screen the problematic position 
of the female spectator, reveling in the contradictions and gender duplicity that define 
that position.  Doane suggests that films should show the constructed, “fantastic, literally 
incredible” gestural nature of traditional femininity.
75
  She calls for a demonstration of 
excesses of femininity that shows “that these are poses, postures, tropes – in short, that 
we are being subjected to a discourse on femininity” that works to make those enactments 
strange and unfamiliar.
76
  Such a film would create “a slippage” between “true” 




Because the binary categories of masculinity and femininity cannot easily contain 
the female spectator, critics such as Gilles Deleuze and Gaylyn Studlar have argued, on 
the other hand, for a masochistic theory of film spectatorship.  Rather than relying as 
Mulvey does on the Oedipal stage as principally formative in our development of 
pleasure in looking, these critics argue for a pre-Oedipal, pre-genital conception of a 
masochistic spectator.  According to Studlar, a major problem with Mulvey’s argument is 
her failure to account for “the powerful maternal image that is viewed as a complex, 
pleasurable ‘screen memory’ by both male and female spectators, even in the patriarchal 
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  By invoking the pre-genital infantile stage in which the infant is helpless and 
submissive to the female, Studlar is able to theorize the spectator outside of the binaries 
of male/masculine and female/feminine.  Not only should the female be theorized outside 
of her relation to castration, Studlar argues, but we should also recognize that it could be 
possible for the male gaze to identify “with the female (even as an ideal ego) or. . .with 
the ‘feminized’ masculine character.”
79
  According to this theory, spectatorship is not 
bound by the rigid binaries of sex and gender, which likewise fail to contain the 
transgender person. Studlar explains that, “among the most important aspects of the 
release of repressed material” that come to the surface as the spectator experiences 
extragenital masochistic pleasure while viewing a film “are the pleasures of re-
experiencing the primary identification with the mother and the pleasurable possibilities 
of gender mobility through identification.”
80
  In other words, this theory of pre-
genital/masochistic pleasure in spectatorship not only allows the female spectator to slip 
between the cracks of masculinity and femininity, but it also explains that the male 
spectator can do so as well.  Just as transgender theory forces a reexamination of 
traditional theories of gender and sexuality, the masochistic theory of the spectator allows 
for the questioning of these same categories. 
But how is the spectatorial position further complicated if the subject on screen, 
like the transgender person, also cannot unproblematically be contained within the gender 
binary?  In her analysis of Rudolph Valentino, Miriam Hansen examines how the figure 
of the effeminate man affects notions of the gaze.  Valentino films call for a reevaluation 
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of traditional theories of the gaze because Valentino plays both the role of the active male 
hero and that of the sexualized, fetishized spectacle.  It is important to note that an 
integral part of Valentino’s star persona was his racialized appearance; he was 
consistently depicted as an erotic, foreign Other.  Although race is important to Hansen’s 
analysis, in the films I analyze, I focus on gender and do not enter into discussions of 
race.  For the sake of clarity and brevity, I will focus on Valentino’s effeminacy and 
forego a synopsis of her arguments about his foreignness. Hansen first explains the 
position of the female spectator, asserting that “the notion of ambivalence is crucial to the 
theory of female spectatorship, precisely because the cinema, while enforcing patriarchal 
hierarchies in its organization of the look, also offers women an institutional opportunity 
to violate the taboo on female scopophilia.”
81
  Women were allowed to experience 
pleasure in looking, a pleasure traditionally available only to men, as they watched films, 
and the cinema therefore emerges as an important arena for reexamining gender taboos 
associated with dynamics of power and the gaze.   
Hansen expands upon the notion of the female spectator as transvestite, 
explaining that the metaphor “suggests that female spectatorship involves dimensions of 
self-reflexivity and role-playing, rather than simply an opposition of active and 
passive.”
82
  Because the female spectator does not have a subject position that can be 
easily defined as either masculine or feminine, her experience calls those binary 
categories into question.  Hansen asserts that this ambiguity has powerful implications for 
the spectator as “the perceptual performance of sexual mobility anticipates, on a playful, 
fictional level, the possibility of social arrangements not founded upon a hierarchically 
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  This potential is realized in films that feature Valentino because 
the instability of the gender positioning of the female is mirrored in the on-screen 
character’s sexual ambivalence. 
Hansen explains that while the plots of Valentino’s films and his star persona 
positioned him as a strong male hero, Valentino’s stylishness and effeminacy undercut 
his masculinity.  He was extraordinarily popular with and adored by female fans, and, in 
an attempt to court female viewers, his body was often sexualized and placed on display.  
In this manner, Valentino played the part of the female spectacle, the erotic object of the 
active female gaze.  Reversing the binary further, Valentino actively made himself a 
spectacle with his penchant for “sumptuous fashion” which “channel[ed] masculine 
exhibitionism into professional display behavior, scopophilia, or identification with 
woman-as-spectacle.”
84
  Hansen, however, asserts that the Valentino figure did more than 
simply cause a reversal of the binary: “a male erotic object [is] a figure of 
overdetermination, an unstable composite figure that connotes ‘the simultaneous presence 
of two positionalities of desire’ (Teresa de Lauretis) and thus calls into question the very 
possibility of polarity rather than simply reversing its terms.”
85
  Valentino’s ambiguous 
sexual and gender identity, like the duality of the female spectator, encourages a 
questioning of binary categories. 
Hansen concludes that, in Valentino films, “the emphasis on costumes and 
disguises, on rituals of dressing and undressing, undermines the voyeuristic structure of 
spectatorship, in that it implicitly acknowledges the spectator as part of the scenario.”
86
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Valentino’s conscious “to-be-looked-at-ness,” to borrow Mulvey’s term, does not allow 
the spectator to feel as though he or she is secretly watching; Valentino knows he is 
watched and performs for the spectator.  Hansen continues, saying, “Thus the film 
advances an identification with the gaze itself, not with source or object but with the gaze 
as an erotic medium.”
87
  Traditional theories of the gaze cannot account for this 
phenomenon because the audience is acutely aware of the fact that they are viewing a 
performance.  Theories of gender performance and the gaze again intersect.  Just as 
Butler argues that the explicit performativity of gender in drag may undermine notions 
that gender identity is innate and unproblematically corresponds to sex, Hansen shows 
that the explicit performativity in Valentino films disrupt the power of the gaze.  
Furthermore, she asserts that these instances of performativity “are foregrounded as 
aspects of a theatricality that encompasses both performer and viewer, which may mean 
something different depending on the viewers’ gender and sexual orientation.”
88
  Just as 
Studlar argues for individualized accounts of gender and sexuality that could resist rigid 
categorization, Hansen argues for individualized accounts of spectatorship that cannot 
“be reduced, a priori, to its symbolic content within a phallic economy of signification,” 
opening the possibility of a theory of spectatorship that is extragenital and not wholly 




Hansen contends, however, that Valentino’s films attempt to portray him as a 
man’s man and place him in the position, albeit spectacularized, of the male hero.  What 
if both the narrative and the sexual/gender identity of the subject on screen are 
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ambiguous?  What if the narrative does not rely on implicit questioning of gender but 
explicitly interrogates sex and gender categories within the plot?  As critics such as 
Mulvey and Kaplan argue, narrative is a powerful force that reflects and constructs 
hierarchies of sexual power through the spectator’s immersion in the narrative and 
identification with characters.  In the films discussed in the following chapters, the 
“oscillating” sex and gender of the character on screen reflect the oscillation of the 
spectator, with excesses of both feminine and masculine performance highlighting the 
constructed nature of gender as well as of the act of gazing at this performance; at the 
same time, the content of the films subjects traditional heteronormative theories of sex 
















Camping at The Birdcage: Parody, Irony and the Spectator 
Mike Nichols’ 1996 comedy, The Birdcage, explores the relationship of a gay 
couple, Armand (Robin Williams) and Albert (Nathan Lane), who are the owner and star 
of a drag club in South Beach, Florida.  Adapted from the French musical and film, La 
Cage aux Folles, The Birdcage centers on the upheaval in Armand and Albert’s lives 
when their son, Val (Dan Futterman), announces his engagement to the daughter of an 
ultra-conservative Senator.  Through Albert’s highly feminine behavior and he and 
Armand’s preparations to meet their future in-laws, the film foregrounds the 
performativity of gender.  Furthermore, Albert’s use of camp both in his drag 
performances and his personal life allow for an ironic reading of his behavior that renders 
feminine stereotypes ludicrous.  However, some audiences may not read Albert’s actions 
as ironic, and thus his behavior may reify oppressive feminine stereotypes.  As such, the 
film explores the key tension inherent in drag performance and allows for a spectatorial 
position that is individualized rather than determined by the sex and gender of the 
spectator. 
Perhaps most basically, the film exposes gender as performative through Albert’s 
drag performances.  As discussed in detail in the first chapter, drag has the potential to 
destabilize normative conceptions of sex and gender by exposing that all gender is like 
drag – not natural, but a set of behaviors one performs – through a male’s successful 
feminine performance.  Albert is the star performer of The Birdcage, the drag club 
Armand owns, and his performances as Starina, his drag alter ego, portray the opulence 
and exaggeration that can be so subversive in drag performance.  At the beginning of the 
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film we see Albert preparing to go onstage as Starina, and his physical appearance falls 
halfway between masculine and feminine.  He wears a feminine silk dressing gown and is 
heavily made up, wearing thick eyeliner, large false lashes, and heavy blush and 
contouring makeup.  Although his facial features are fairly masculine, the makeup and 
clothing successfully feminize him.  However, he has not yet donned his wig, and his 
short hair is covered by a small net and tape in preparation.  Similarly, he needs to shave, 
and light stubble covers his upper lip and chin.  When it is time for him to get ready for 
his performance, he sits in front of the lighted mirror of his vanity wearing his dressing 
gown and full makeup and exaggeratedly lengthens his upper lip, rolling over it with an 
electric razor.  The sight problematizes the spectator’s relationship with Albert in light of 
traditional theories of spectatorship such as that of Laura Mulvey.  Although the audience 
knows Albert is biologically male, his homosexuality and feminized appearance render 
both identification and objectification difficult if not impossible for the male spectator.  
Either position would threaten his heterosexuality as he would either identify with a gay 
man or sexualize one.  The female spectator’s position is similarly contentious as any 
cross-identification with the male spectator’s position or masochistic pleasure in Albert’s 
objectification relies on the male spectator’s ability to relate unproblematically to the 
male character on screen. 
However, as we will see in the case of Victor/Victoria as well, it is possible that 
the female spectator could see her indeterminate, oscillating subject position reflected in 
Albert’s indeterminate appearance.  Traditional notions of female spectatorship often 
utilize metaphors of shifting, alternating modes of access to pleasure in watching film.  
Albert’s simultaneously feminine and masculine appearance could, as Doane suggested 
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feminist cinema should do, reflect the female spectator’s position by showing that gender 
is just a “pose, posture, [or] trope.”
90
  In this manner, the female spectator could identify 
with Albert while seeing that gender is performative, opening up a more fluid space for 
exploring identity.   
However, as Roberta Mock points out in her analysis of transvestism, drag can 
also reify negative stereotypes by making gender performance laughable.  As discussed 
in the previous chapter, Mock contends that the audience often “laugh[s] at, rather than 
with” the drag performer.
91
  This distinction between laughing at and laughing with the 
performer relies on matters of identification.  Either the spectator identifies with the drag 
queen and his intentionally ironic deployment of gender stereotypes and laughs along 
with the performer, joining him in the subversion of normative sex and gender binaries as 
they are rendered ridiculous; or the spectator does not identify with the performer, and 
thus the drag queen himself becomes the object of ridicule rather than the identity he 
parodically dons.  As was the case with sexed/gendered spectatorship, the incongruous 
sex and gender of the performer complicates and problematizes the audience’s ability to 
identify with the performer.  For Mock, when the audience laughs at the drag queen, the 
performance acts as a “'safety valve'-ultimately, a disincentive towards change in the 
social sphere and the recuperation of absent authority.”
92
  As Albert, Nathan Lane plays 
this scene for laughs by overemphasizing the shaving bit.  If, as discussed above, the 
spectator is unable to identify with Albert, his male body and feminine behavior and 
appearance are portrayed as a joke, not as subversive questioning of the naturalness of 
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gender.  This tension remains throughout the film: the use of drag and Albert’s excessive 
femininity as a source of humor against the potentially subversive foregrounding of 
gender performativity.  I will discuss this dichotomy more fully in my later examination 
of the camp aspects of drag performance. 
During Albert’s first performance as Starina, we see his feminine appearance on 
full display.  He descends a backlit staircase onto the stage, his outline showcasing an 
elaborate hat with veiling and a sumptuous gown.  As he steps into the spotlight, we see 
his heavily made-up face surrounded by sparkling netting that is attached to a large 
leopard hat.  He is wearing leopard print gloves and a fluffy leopard muff, and his 
flowing black gown sparkles with jewels.  His nose slightly in the air and a serene smile 
on his face, he looks the part of an aristocratic older woman.  His over-the-top clothing is 
characteristic of the excessiveness of drag performance and reflects a heightened version 
of normative femininity.  As described in detail above, such overt performance of a 
gender different from his sex renders traditional theories of spectatorship moot.  
However, as did Nathan Lane’s acting in the shaving scene, Albert’s drag act similarly 
plays his gender performance for laughs.  He announces to the audience that he just got 
back from safari in Africa where he “picked up a new muff,” motioning to his leopard 
accessory.  However, the audience laughs uproariously, catching the double entendre as 
“muff” is a common euphemism for a vagina.  The joke’s humor comes from the fact that 
Albert’s sex and his gendered appearance do not match up.  The audience knows that 
Albert does not have a vagina, and his ironic assertion that he “picked up a muff” plays 
on the fact that sex is not something one can so easily acquire.  To underscore his male 
sex, a leopard tail springs out of the muff as he speaks to the audience. The phallic nature 
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of the tail reifies his maleness; although he can perform femininity with the help of the 
muff, the tail reminds us he is not actually a woman.  Thus the joke makes fun of his drag 
performance, potentially making his incongruous feminine gender and male body 
ridiculous rather than subversive. 
 Using Mock’s analysis of the potential lack of subversion present in drag 
performance, one could argue that Albert merely reifies dominant views and stereotypes 
about women, turning his gender performance into a joke.  For some audiences, that is 
probably the case, because drag performance relies on the parody and irony associated 
with camp.  As Katrin Horn explains it in her analysis of camp and gender 
performativity, “Defined by wit, by an awareness of the performativity of the everyday 
life or ‘the natural’ and by an estimation of the aesthetically appealing over the morally 
right, camp offered a mode for rejecting middle-class values.”
93
  Particularly among drag 
queens and the gay community, camp was deployed to reject dominant sex and gender 
roles.  However, camp relies upon irony to make its point.  Drag performance presents 
normative femininity in such a way as to reject its naturalness and thereby its power as an 
oppressive stereotype.  Therefore, drag’s explicit message is the reification of gender 
norms, and that reification can engender humor through the performer’s exaggerated 
femininity and over-the-top appearance and actions.  However, the ironic meaning camp 
produces is a subversion of those norms.  As Linda Hutcheon points out, camp’s meaning 
“happens in the space between (and including) the said and the unsaid; it needs both to 
happen.”
94
  Therefore, there is no essential meaning inherent in the text which the 
audience passively receives; rather, the audience actively participates in the meaning-
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making process, a process which here relies on the understanding of drag’s parody as a 
subversive device rather than mere humor.   
Hutcheon goes on to say, “The said and the unsaid coexist for the interpreter; and 
each has meaning in relation to the other because they literally 'interact'…to create the 
real 'ironic' meaning.”
95
  For the audience to understand the meaning the parody of drag 
creates, to decode the message as ironic, they must be “in” on the joke and understand 
that the performance is intentionally exaggerated, often for the purpose of rejecting 
hegemonic values.  Thus Albert’s campy performances can be read in two ways, 
depending upon the audience: as reifying the dominant ideology by making gender 
performativity a “safety valve” of a joke or as mobilizing the humor of his exaggerated 
performance in order to ironically reflect on the performative nature of all femininity.  
The goal of this chapter, and of this thesis as a whole, is to understand the spectator’s 
complex relationship and identification with atypically-gendered characters.  However, 
the parody of camp and drag performance renders impossible a unified spectatorial 
position, as the spectator’s experiences depend upon their individual gender politics.  
Therefore the film disrupts traditional theories of spectatorship by making available 
multiple spectatorial positions that are not dependent upon the sex or gender of the 
spectator, mirroring Gayle Salamon’s description of acategorical desire as discussed in 
the previous chapter: the notion that “phenomenological experiences of the body and the 
subject are individual rather than categorical.”
96
  In order to analyze fully the ironic 
meanings created by the text, from now on this chapter will explore these two main 
spectatorial positions produced by the film – the spectator who is unaware of or unable to 
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read critically the ironic meanings produced by Albert’s camp and laughs at him and the 
spectator who understands the subversive meaning and laughs with him. 
The film goes on to show that Albert’s campy performance of normative femininity 
extends past the stage to rehearsals and into his personal life.  Shortly after the drag show, 
Albert is rehearsing for a new number with a young, attractive male dancer while 
Armand supervises.  The scene begins with a close up of a strappy silver high-heeled 
shoe, then pans up to show legs clad in black tights, a loud printed blouse tied at the 
waist, and a bright pink top.  We then see that this femininely-dressed character is Albert, 
who is holding a sparkly golden microphone and lightly fluttering his hands to the music.  
As such, Albert does not just perform femininity during his drag performance; he appears 
and behaves in a feminine manner even without an audience present to enjoy his 
performance.  However, he is not wearing full makeup or a wig, so he is not “stealth;” 
that is, he is not seeking to pass as a natural woman but rather incorporates feminine 
looks and behavior into his overall male appearance.  The effect is similar to that of the 
aforementioned scene in which a fully made-up Albert shaves his face and chest.  The 
incongruent images foreground the unnaturalness and performativity of gender.  
Although it is obvious that Albert is biologically male, he comfortably wears feminine 
clothing and employs feminine body language.  However, as with the shaving scene, his 
performance reads as humorous.  His outfit and accessories can be read as parodically 
feminine with the strappy heels, tights, pink blouse and sparkly microphone.  Similarly, 
his hand gestures are silly and clearly not meant to be taken seriously; they are over-
exaggerated and fairly ridiculous.  If the spectator reads the scene at face value, Albert’s 
appearance is ridiculous and funny; his stereotypically feminine clothing and behavior 
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look silly, and he reifies negative feminine stereotypes as the audience laughs at him.  
However, for a spectator who is sensitive to his parodic performance, the butt of the joke 
is stereotypical femininity rather than Albert himself.  For this spectator, Albert’s action 
calls into question, as Doane terms it, “the initial mime” of femininity and encourages a 
reevaluation of gender norms.
97
 
Additionally, in this scene Albert displays a great deal of self-awareness about his 
performance.   He is incensed by the unprofessionalism of the young man, in particular 
the fact that he is chewing gum during rehearsal.  Unable to control himself any longer, 
Albert yells, “I saw that,” referring to the young man’s gum chewing, and then says 
wearily, “Well, this is impossible.  Either I’m an artist or I’m just some cheap drag queen 
playing it straight so he can get laughs.”  In addition to containing the hyperbole and 
drama associated with the diva archetype, this statement speaks directly to the theoretical 
issues surrounding drag performance as discussed in the first chapter and above.  Albert 
puts forth the two possible interpretations of his drag performance: that of an artist who 
creates ironic meaning or “some cheap drag queen” who is the object of laughter.  The 
notion of the drag queen as an artist with noble goals invokes the subversive potential 
Butler describes drag performance can accomplish by encouraging ironic meaning 
through parody, encouraging the audience to recognize that “all gender is like drag.”
98
  
The successful performance of heterosexuality could, as Doane suggested, show that 
femininity is but a “pose, posture, [or] trope,” and “render void the initial mime” by 
exposing all femininity as a performative gesture.
99
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However, the cheap drag queen exploits the humor of the situation – that of a man 
pretending to be a woman – making gender performance and the false heterosexuality 
that performance displays into a joke.  Interestingly, Albert declares that the young male 
dancer would be the one to “get laughs,” not Albert.  The young man would be the one 
who was, from the audience’s perspective, fooled by Albert’s gender performance and 
mistakenly pursuing a man who is dressed as a woman.  We see that Albert understands 
the conundrum of drag performance and the audience’s possible misinterpretation of it if 
they miss the irony.  Instead of exposing all gender and indeed sexuality as performative, 
the audience’s laughter at the young man would reify the importance of biological sex 
through his accidental homosexual attraction to Albert’s Starina.  Albert’s statement 
foregrounds the very spectatorial issue the text raises, alerting the audience to other 
possible interpretations of the scene they are witnessing.  But with this line, Albert places 
the pressure on himself rather than on the audience.  Even if he is a “cheap drag queen 
playing it straight [to get] laughs,” the audience’s reading of his gender performance as 
intentionally campy and parodic can still render him subversive.  The film’s self-
awareness thus encourages an ironic reading of the text as it consciously works out the 
very issues it raises, pushing the audience to examine beyond the surface of Albert’s 
performance to the complex meanings it creates. 
Albert continues to act the diva during the rehearsal, complaining that Armand 
always asks so much of him from his performances and screaming in the young dancer’s 
face when he blows a bubble while Albert is singing.  But the strongest showing of his 
highly dramatic, campy performance of negative heterosexual female stereotypes comes 
when he is neither performing on stage nor rehearsing.  As the film opens, Armand learns 
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that Albert’s Starina, his headline performer, refuses to go on.  The scene cuts to Albert’s 
dressing room, where he is lying on a chaise lounge with a pink blanket covering his head 
while he speaks to their houseboy, Agador.  “No, Agador,” Albert says.  “Victoria Page 
will not dance the dance of the red shoes tonight or any other night… Victoria Page is 
dead… Do you know how she died?  Alone, weeping for her lover.”  His elevated diction 
and syntax contribute to the highly dramatic quality of his declaration, and his actions 
and words play to multiple feminine stereotypes.  The first is, of course, that of the diva 
who refuses to perform.  The line references Michael Powell’s film, The Red Shoes 
(1948). Albert’s invocation of this film, and particularly the ending in which Victoria 
(Moira Shearer) melodramatically leaps from a balcony onto the train tracks and dies 
rather than perform with a broken heart, exposes his performance of the feminine 
stereotype of emotional oversensitivity, particularly to matters of romantic love.  
Furthermore, he is lying on a chaise lounge or fainting couch, a piece of furniture 
commonly associated with women, covering himself with a pink blanket; he is literally 
cloaked in the most stereotypically feminine color.   
For the spectator who does not see the irony of Albert’s performance and sees him 
as “just some cheap drag queen,” his behavior reifies several of the more negative aspects 
associated with traditional femininity.  Those norms are not questioned but rather 
embodied and reproduced, making him and his incongruous sex and exaggerated gender 
into a joke.  However, his over-the-top, hyperfeminine behavior utilizes the irony and 
parody of camp.  His male sex throws into greater relief the femininity of his actions, 
which are already extreme, foregrounding the performativity of gender through his 
melodramatic and obviously mimetic behavior.  He plays the part of the dramatic diva, 
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performing the tropes of the disgruntled performer and love-starved star.  For the 
spectator who is, as Hutcheon put it, in on the joke, Albert’s actions produce an ironic 
meaning.  The ridiculousness of his actions does not render him the butt of the joke as it 
does for spectators who do not read the performance as ironic; rather the butt of the joke 
is “the initial mime,” or the femininity he is exaggeratedly reproducing.  Thus the ironic 
meaning questions and subverts stereotypical femininity, encouraging the audience to 
reflect upon the constructed nature of gender norms.   
As Albert continues to bemoan his loss of Armand’s love, Armand stalks up the 
stairs, screaming Albert’s name and heading for the door into his dressing room.  Albert 
screams and jumps from his chaise lounge, revealing that he wears a flowery, silken 
dressing gown.  He rushes to the door and slams it shut, pulling a chair in front of it and 
wailing, “I don’t want him to see me! I’m hideous!”  Eventually Armand muscles his way 
through the door and Albert screams, running to hide himself behind a curtain printed 
with large pink feathers.  He shrieks, “Don’t look at me! I’m fat and hideous!”  Agador 
tries to console him, telling him his unhappiness will pass, and Albert replies, “I’m in 
such pain; it’ll never pass.”  Albert again portrays negative feminine stereotypes through 
his emotional, irrational responses.  He fixates on his appearance, calling himself fat and 
hideous multiple times throughout the scene, and refuses to listen to reason and gain 
control of his emotions.  He is unhinged and childish, enacting the stereotype that women 
are hysterical, emotionally-driven, vain creatures set in opposition to the logical, 
reasonable male.  As Armand tells him he must do the show because the audience is 
waiting, Albert’s demeanor changes.  He haughtily struts to the chaise lounge, declaring, 
“That’s all I am to you: a meal ticket.  Never mind about my feelings.  Never mind about 
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my suffering.  It’s all about your show,” and asks Armand for a palimony agreement.  His 
capriciousness reflects the stereotype that women are volatile and constantly changing 
their minds; only moments ago he was bemoaning his failing relationship, but now he 
demands a divorce due to a perceived personal slight.  Again, the audience may read his 
irrational behavior as playing to and reifying stereotypical femininity, reinforcing the 
masculine/feminine binary rather than calling it into question by making himself and his 
gender performance the butt of the joke.  But for the spectator who reads the exchange 
ironically, although the “said” meaning reifies gender stereotypes, the “unsaid” meaning 
calls those stereotypes into question by virtue of their exaggerated absurdity, encouraging 
a recognition of all gender as performative. 
Albert then explicitly places his and Armand’s relationship in terms of a 
traditional heterosexual partnership.  Armand replies to Albert’s rants with resigned 
sarcasm, and Albert hisses, “Don’t use that tone with me – that sarcastic, contemptuous 
tone that says you know everything because you’re a man and I know nothing because 
I’m a woman.”  Just as with his line in the rehearsal scene in which he identifies the 
tension within drag performance, this statement is densely packed with meaning.  Albert 
speaks directly to the stereotype which this scene is exploring – that men are rational 
beings whereas women are ignorant and illogical.  However, just as in the rehearsal, 
Albert’s behavior confirms the stereotype.  Later in the scene we learn that Albert is upset 
because he believes Armand is cheating on him with another man, which turns out to be 
untrue.  However, at this point, the spectator is unaware of Albert’s suspicions, so his 
behavior seems utterly inappropriate and nonsensical.  Armand is calm and controlled 
whereas Albert seems, as Agador describes him, “crazy.”  Again, his behavior plays into 
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the very stereotype against which he argues.  However, such self-reflexivity reflects the 
conscious parody and campiness of Albert’s performance.  Even though Albert is not 
performing for a diegetic audience, the film spectator has the opportunity to read the 
scene as ironic; in such a reading, Albert’s ludicrous behavior makes fun of feminine 
stereotypes through his heightened deployment of gendered behavior and his over-the-top 
reactions.  Such exaggeration played for humor can, when read as subversive parody, 
deprive feminine stereotypes of their currency by rendering them ridiculous.  
Additionally, he calls himself not feminine but a woman.  The implications of such a 
statement are unclear.  Throughout the film Albert behaves and dresses in a feminine 
manner, but his hair is cropped short and he does not wear makeup.  His identity is 
difficult to categorize, and, as the previous chapter explored, categories of transgender 
identity are slippery.  Albert never self-identifies, so we are unsure if he sees himself as a 
feminine homosexual man or as transgender.  It seems as though his statement is 
referring to their roles in their relationship; Armand plays the masculine role and Albert 
the feminine. 
Although the scene undoubtedly reinforces stereotypes, it also foregrounds them, 
drawing the spectator’s attention.  Albert’s exaggerated femininity certainly exposes 
gender as performative, a message which is heightened by the fact that Albert is 
obviously biologically male.  The scene is thus contradictory, just as are Albert’s identity 
and the audience’s potential readings of the scene.  It resists categorization as wholly 
subversive or wholly in service to the dominant ideology.  It is, like drag, simultaneously 
both, and seemingly self-consciously so as it plays to the very sexism Albert identifies.  
As a result, the scene, and indeed the film as a whole, provides for an individualized 
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spectatorial position that is not defined by sex or gender but rather by each spectator’s 
interpretation of the text.  This individualized position allows spectators to break out of 
oppressive roles by experiencing a world of campy, gendered play in which common 
stereotypes are rendered ridiculous and gender is explicitly and ironically performed. 
 Soon after this scene we discover that Armand’s mystery man was actually Val, 
his twenty-year-old son from a brief heterosexual tryst during college whom he and 
Albert raised together.  Val has returned home from school to tell his parents that he is 
engaged to Barbara (Calista Flockhart), the daughter of right-wing Senator Kevin Keeley 
(Gene Hackman).  After one of Keeley’s colleagues dies embroiled in a sex scandal, the 
Keeleys decide to seek refuge from the hounding media by visiting Val’s parents in South 
Beach.  However, Barbara and Val have whitewashed his colorful family: their Jewish 
surname, Goldman, becomes Coleman; instead of the owners of a drag club, Armand is a 
cultural attaché to Greece; all mention of Armand’s homosexuality has been removed; 
and the flamboyantly feminine Albert is not in the picture at all.  Val frantically tells 
Armand that he must get rid of Albert before the Keeleys’ arrival and find a woman to 
pretend to be his mother. 
 However, Albert discovers their plan and flees from the house, predictably and 
melodramatically heartbroken.  Armand follows him, and Albert wails and cries over the 
incident, nearly fainting (or at least pretending to faint) so that Armand must hold him up 
and half-carry him into a local café.  At the table, Albert continues to moan and swoon as 
Armand makes him a cold compress.  Albert’s overly exaggerated feminine performance 
again reproduces negative stereotypes about women; he is overly emotional and dramatic, 
sensitive to the point of fainting, and in desperate need of Armand to care for him and 
Lawson 45 
calm him down.  He acts like a child, completely overtaken by his feelings and incapable 
of rational thought.  However, once Armand begins to pamper him, showering him with 
the attention he so craves, he immediately calms and comes up with a plan to reinsert 
himself into the meeting with the Keeleys.  He suggests he could masquerade as Uncle 
Al, to which Armand replies that a gay uncle is little better than a gay parent.  Albert 
declares, “I can play it straight” as he daintily lifts his water glass to take a sip, his pinky 
held aloft.  Armand scoffs, “Oh, please. Look at you!”  For Albert, femininity is his 
default behavior, whether from natural inclination or long-term repetition.  His 
performance has become naturalized even though it is, from the dominant ideological 
perspective, incongruous with his biological sex.  This scene again foregrounds the 
performativity of gender, encouraging the spectator to question the stability of gendered 
behavior and providing a structuring feminine background against which his forthcoming 
education in masculine performance can stand out. 
Butler posited that drag performance could expose that all gender is like drag, and 
her theory is reflected here in the most clearly subversive sequence of the film.
100
  
Armand pauses and looks at Albert, reconsidering his declaration that Albert’s ability to 
pass as masculine and heterosexual was impossible.  He says, “You’re a great performer. 
I’m a great director,” and vows to help Albert perform masculinity.  Armand explicitly 
marks Albert’s normatively “natural” gender as performative, a behavior that must be 
taught and learned, foregrounding its social construction, and the rest of the scene 
involves Albert’s indoctrination into the ways of men.  First, Armand teaches him how to 
eat like a man.  Albert demonstrates how he puts mustard on to bread, delicately dipping 
his spoon into the dish and spreading it lightly.  “No!” Armand says, grabbing a knife and 
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dunking it sloppily into the mustard and slapping it haphazardly onto his bread.  “Men 
smear,” he declares, and encourages Albert to practice this stereotypically masculine act.  
The scene foregrounds the expectations associated with gender; Albert’s light, feminine 
behavior is directly contrasted with Armand’s aggressive, masculine behavior.  Albert 
attempts to smear the mustard with his knife but collapses into a trembling, wailing mess 
when he mistakenly stabs through the bread and ruins it.  Armand calms him down, 
saying, “The important thing to remember is not to go to pieces.  React like a man: 
calmly.”  For the third time, the film’s dialogue self-consciously speaks directly to the 
stereotypes the characters perform.  Armand, the more masculine partner, is consistently 
calm and rational whereas the feminine Albert is consistently melodramatic and 
emotional.  This scene openly marks those behaviors as performative rather than natural, 
mutable rather than fixed.  Albert accepts Armand’s direction, stating, “You’re right.  
There’s no reason to get hysterical,” again setting up the binary opposition between 
masculine/reason and feminine/hysteria.  He vows to perform masculine rationality and 
suppress his emotional, feminine performance.   
Such explicit foregrounding of the performativity of gender draws the spectator’s 
focus as we watch Albert learn behaviors that the dominant ideology holds should come 
naturally to him.  Just as Albert performs exaggerated, parodic femininity, so Armand 
teaches him equally exaggerated masculinity, further exposing that gendered behavior is 
learned behavior.  Armand’s next lesson is how to walk like a man.  Albert demonstrates 
his feminine walk, taking small steps and swaying his hips with his hands held daintily 
out to his sides.  Armand tells him to imitate John Wayne’s distinctive masculine 
swagger because, as he says, “If anyone was a man” it was the Duke.  As Armand directs 
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Albert to mimic the quintessential man’s man, the scene “renders void the initial mime,” 
thus calling into question naturalized masculinity and exposing even John Wayne’s 
behavior as performative.
101
  Albert’s hobbling, lopsided mimicry further exposes the 
ridiculous nature of Wayne’s exaggerated masculinity.  When he returns to the table for 
an assessment of his walk, Armand declares, whether sarcastically or truthfully, “It was 
perfect. I just never realized John Wayne walked that way.”  Regardless of whether he 
was serious or not, the statement implies that not only Albert’s attempt at masculinity but 
also Wayne’s masculinity is a learned, practiced behavior rather than natural.  In contrast 
to earlier scenes in which spectators had to intuit Albert’s gender performance as parodic 
and ironic, this scene explicitly marks gendered behavior as a performed set of behaviors 
that must be perfected over time.  Here the ironic meaning is spelled out clearly for the 
spectator; Albert is play-acting at masculinity, and the audience knows he knows he is 
pretending and they experience his work to perfect masculinity with him.  Such 
identification with the process of learning gender encourages the spectator more strongly 
than ever to laugh with Albert rather than at him as he stumbles through the motions, 
urging an ironic reading. 
Next, Armand teaches Albert the proper ways to greet and speak as a man and 
chooses sports as their stereotypically male topic of conversation.  Albert walks up to 
Armand, holds his hand out flat and squeals girlishly, “How about those Dolphins?”  
Armand criticizes his overly feminine performance and instructs him to hold his hand out 
sideways with a tight wrist – “I’m shaking it, not kissing it” – and then lowers his voice 
to a gruff, masculine bark and complains loudly about the Miami Dolphins’ failure in 
their last game.  Armand, the more masculine of the two, still must change his demeanor 
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and perform to be read as a heterosexual male.  Just as Albert performs exaggerated, 
stereotypical femininity, so Armand embodies stereotypical masculinity; he moves and 
speaks harshly, ranting about sports.  The scene categorizes a successful gender 
performance as one that adheres to narrow gender stereotypes. Armand, however, is at a 
disadvantage as Albert’s teacher because he is gay.  According to heteronormative 
standards, Armand’s gay masculinity is inadequate and he, too, must consciously perform 
behavior that is outside of his normal comfort zone.  Indeed, his lack of knowledge about 
proper heterosexual masculinity explicitly comes into play.  Albert replies to his 
complaint about the Dolphins by saying, “How do you think I feel? Betrayed, 
bewildered…”  He trails off and looks questioningly at Armand.  “Wrong response?”  
Armand stares back blankly and says, “I’m not sure.”  This exchange highlights the 
difficulty and nuance associated with even the broad strokes of stereotypical gender 
performance.  The behaviors are so precise that even the slightest mistake can show the 
artifice in the action, exposing how rigid and limiting such categories are.  Armand and 
Albert’s difficulty foregrounds for the spectator not only the artificiality of gender but 
also how constricting those roles are. 
The scene ends by showing the effects of stereotypical masculinity pushed too far.  
Albert mistakenly bumps into a man who is seated near them.  The man turns around, 
annoyed, and says, “Take it easy.”  Albert apologizes profusely until Armand struts up, 
mimicking John Wayne, and says, “You take it easy, pilgrim.”  He casts a knowing look 
at Albert, who recognizes that Armand will be demonstrating an example of masculine 
behavior.  Armand is rude to the man, refusing to acknowledge Albert’s error, and the 
man looks up at him and says, “Why are you being such a prick?”  This line demonstrates 
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the first crack in such aggressive masculinity.  The seated man is not obviously 
homosexual, and from his tone of voice, clothing and appearance we can assume he is 
what society deems a “normal” man; that is, he is white and heterosexual.  However, 
Armand’s masculine performance reads as foreign and confusing to him.  He expects 
men to behave politely rather than attacking with little to no provocation.    Such a 
discrepancy reflects what Kenneth MacKinnon describes as the difference between 
hegemonic masculinity and ideal masculinity.  Ideal masculinity embodies stereotypical 
“cultural ideals” of masculinity, such as aggression, pride, violence, etc., whereas 
hegemonic masculinity reflects the “actual personalities of the majority of men,” which 
MacKinnon says “may show little correspondence with the cultural ideals.”
102
  Ideal 
masculinity, such as Armand reproduces, is thus an overexaggeration and does not blend 
in with normal, everyday masculinity even as it is held up as the quintessential model.  
Just as Albert’s feminine performances reflected on the ludicrous nature of stereotypical 
femininity, so does this scene expose ideal masculinity as untenable in real life.  This 
exaggerated example again further exposes gendered behavior as ridiculous by virtue of 
its parody.   
Ultimately Albert fails to perform masculinity adequately and eventually slips 
back into a role with which he is much more comfortable: that of the doting housewife 
and mother.  Near the beginning of the film when Armand tells Albert that Val has come 
home and is sleeping in his room, Albert peeks in Val’s room quietly.  Then, noticing that 
Val has left his clothes all over the floor, he walks in and picks them up to take to the 
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laundry, shaking his head and smiling.  The next day Albert irons Val’s clothes after he’s 
washed them and, when Armand tells him that Val is engaged, he weeps over a 
scrapbook of Val’s childhood photographs.  These scenes categorize Albert as 
consciously fulfilling the normative mothering role.  He takes care of Val, performing the 
domestic task of tidying his room and washing his clothes even though Val is certainly 
old enough to do so on his own.  Indeed, in a scene in which Barbara tells her 
conservative father about Val’s mother (leaving out, of course, the fact that Albert is 
male), Keeley declares it is “refreshing” that she is a housewife.  Such behavior is 
explicitly classified as conservative through Keeley’s approval.  Furthermore, Albert’s 
highly emotional and nostalgic reaction to the news that Val is engaged as he cries over 
old photographs is typically feminine and stands in stark contrast to Armand’s reaction.  
Armand forbade Val to get married, declaring he was far too young, but then relented 
when he saw that Val was very much in love with Barbara.  Albert, who does not play the 
role of head of the household, does not have this power over Val and passively and 
emotionally reminisces rather than taking action to prevent his marriage.  His actions, 
particularly when contrasted with Armand’s, show that Albert’s stereotypically feminine 
behavior extends to his role as mother to Val.  By performing this mothering role, Albert 
reifies the notion that mothers should take care of their children by performing domestic 
tasks, but are passive when contrasted with the father’s dominance over the child’s 
behavior. 
The film goes on to reconfigure motherhood as a distinctly performative role 
rather than a natural one through Albert’s campy actions.  As previously discussed, when 
the Keeleys decide to visit Val’s family in South Beach, Val and Armand need a mother 
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for their charade.  They contact Val’s birth mother, Katherine (Christina Baranski), 
whom Val has never met, and she agrees to play the part of the mother.  When Armand 
goes to meet with her, she explains that she has not been involved in Val’s life because 
she is not very maternal.  Armand tells her not to worry because “Albert’s practically a 
breast.”  This line explicitly foregrounds the performative aspects of motherhood and 
inverts expectations about natural maternal instinct.  Although Katherine gave birth to 
Val, she had no desire to act as his mother.  The dominant ideology holds that mothering 
is natural; when a woman gives birth, she automatically bonds with and desires to care 
for her child.  However, Katherine does not experience this instant bond and is happy to 
let Armand and Albert parent him.  Albert was, as previously discussed, happy to take on 
the role of mother.  Armand’s humorous description of him as “practically a breast” not 
only shows how adept Albert is at performing motherhood but also conflates the natural, 
i.e. the body of the mother, with the social construct, i.e. the role of the mother.  Even 
though Albert does not have breasts and did not birth or feed Val, he embodies the 
behavior associated with the nurturing mother.   
However, this subversion of the dominant paradigm of male/father and 
female/mother will displease the conservative Keeleys, who an essentialized view of sex 
and gender.  Even though Katherine has never met Val, she must act like his mother in 
order to conform to societal expectations as exemplified by the Keeleys.  As a result, this 
scene directly calls into question those expectations, for it is clear that Albert is truly 
Val’s mother, problematizing notions of natural femininity and motherhood.  By contrast, 
Katherine, Val’s “natural” mother, is the one who will have to perform consciously 
outside of her comfort zone and pretend to be maternal.  Thus the film categorizes the 
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Keeleys’ reliance on sex as the marker of gendered behavior such as motherhood as 
misguided by foregrounding the performativity of mothering. 
Unfortunately, en route to Armand’s house for dinner with the Keeleys, Katherine 
gets stuck in traffic, and Val and Armand awkwardly entertain the Keeleys alone.  
However, Albert soon emerges dressed in a pink dress suit with pearls and a blonde wig, 
ready to play the role of Val’s mother.  The spectator is aware that “Mrs. Coleman” is 
Albert; he is not particularly convincing as a woman.  Therefore, the spectator cannot 
suture his or her gaze to that of Sen. and Mrs. Keeley, who believe that Albert is female.  
Through this lack of identification, the scene foregrounds the performativity of gender 
and expectations.  The Keeleys do not see that Mrs. Coleman is male because Albert’s 
behavior successfully conforms to their standards of conservative heterosexual 
femininity, and, according to the dominant ideology to which they hold, such femininity 
is natural.  Indeed, when Sen. Keeley discovers that Mrs. Coleman is actually Albert near 
the end of the film, he is confused and disbelieving, and his wife has to explain that 
Albert is male before he understands.  For Sen. Keeley, such a feminine performance 
from a male is inconceivable, so for the spectator, the Keeleys reactions to Mrs. Coleman 
contain ironic humor through their subversion of gender binaries.  As such, the Keeleys 
are the ones the audience laughs at, undermining the conservative ideology on which 
their ridiculous misunderstanding is based.  Furthermore, the inability to identify with the 
characters that react to Mrs. Coleman as a woman prevents any tendency to objectify or 
fetishize her, and the ironic distance that Albert’s exaggerated performance creates 
undermines the stereotypes he performs rather than reifying them. 
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Although the spectator cannot identify with the Keeleys, he or she can identify 
with Armand, Val and Barbara who know that Mrs. Coleman is Albert in drag.  
Throughout the meal they are terrified that Albert will make a mistake and reveal that he 
is biologically male; thus, the spectator’s identification with their gaze further 
foregrounds the performativity of gender and the dire consequences of an inadequate 
performance.  If Albert fails here, the Keeleys likely will not agree to let their daughter 
marry Val.  The stakes are high, which emphasizes that, although gender performance is 
unnatural, it is nonetheless real in that it has serious material consequences.  The 
spectator’s knowledgability about Albert’s sex and consequent identification with 
Armand, Val and Barbara creates tension and a hyperawareness of gender performativity.  
However, Armand, Val and Barbara need not be worried; the Keeleys, and in particular 
Sen. Keeley, are very taken by Mrs. Coleman.  Her conservative beliefs impress them.  
She agrees with Sen. Keeley about the importance of prayer in the classroom, unwittingly 
agrees with Rush Limbaugh about the scandal in which Sen. Keeley is embroiled, and 
declares that she “pities the woman who is too busy to stay home and take care of her 
man.”  Even Barbara forgets that Albert is male, saying, “He sounds so much like a 
mother.”   
However, Albert’s professed views on conservative issues are highly exaggerated 
and continue to produce the parodic irony associated with camp performance. Sen. 
Keeley brings up the fact that some pro-lifers think that, in order to stop abortions, the 
doctors who perform them should be killed.  Mrs. Coleman disagrees, declaring the 
doctors are only doing their jobs and instead suggests that the mothers be killed.  She 
recognizes that the fetus will die as well but says, “It’s going to be aborted anyway, so 
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why not let it go down with the ship?”  This position is obviously extreme and 
encourages murder, the very act that pushes most people to adopt a pro-life position.  But 
Sen. Keeley is not appalled; on the contrary he tells Val that his mother is a passionate 
woman and he loves her.  As discussed earlier in this chapter and in the previous one, one 
of the key features of drag and camp is its exaggeration, which in turn calls into question 
the veracity and naturalness of the “original” which it purports to mime.  Here, Albert’s 
performance not only calls into question femininity but other conservative ideological 
beliefs.  His exaggeratedly conservative positions are ridiculous but are also considered 
and seemingly accepted by Sen. Keeley.  As such, his actions render conservatism as a 
whole ludicrous.  The dinner scene not only encourages the spectator to question the 
naturalness of gender but also the whole of conservative dominant ideology.  Albert’s 
performance does not reify those dominant beliefs but rather undermines them by virtue 
of his exaggeration. 
The performance falls apart when Katherine shows up to play the part of Val’s 
mother.  Sen. Keeley is confused and angrily asks, “How many mothers does Val have?”  
Then Val stands up for Albert for the first time.  Throughout the film he was in favor of 
hiding Albert away from the Keeleys.  But now he walks up to Albert and removes his 
wig, saying, “Just one.  This is my mother.”  Sen. Keeley is horrified when he realizes 
Albert is male, but Albert replies, “Nothing’s changed.  It’s still me.”  Here we see 
clearly how much Sen. Keeley’s conservative beliefs, which have been rendered 
ridiculous throughout this sequence, prize sex over performed gender.  He will not accept 
Albert as Val’s mother because he is male and did not give birth to Val.  But the scene 
goes on to cement Albert’s role as mother; Armand introduces Katherine as “the lady 
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who had Val,” not as his mother; her role in his life ended when she gave birth, and 
Albert took over.  Katherine is proud of Val and Albert, telling Albert, “You did a good 
job.”  Consequently, the scene explicitly foregrounds the importance of performed gender 
over sex, effectively subverting Keeley’s conservative beliefs. 
Overall the film successfully highlights the performativity of gender, undercutting 
beliefs that gender is natural.  Through the use of parody and irony, the camp aspects of 
the film allow for multiple readings.  These differing readings are the result of the 
audience’s personal beliefs, not their sex or gender, and thus the film encourages a way 
of seeing that is outside such rigid binaries.  Furthermore, the ultimate butt of the film’s 
joke is the Keeleys and their ultra-conservative beliefs.  At the end of the film, the 
Keeleys must escape a mob of journalists by dressing as drag queens, subverting even 
their own ideology by embodying the very thing they fear and hate.  As such, the film 
closes by highlighting the utility of fluid gender and sexuality, subverting normative 












“I’m my own man, so to speak”: Gender Performance, Utopia and Voyeuristic Pleasure 
in Blake Edwards’ Victor/Victoria 
Blake Edwards’ 1982 musical comedy Victor/Victoria tells the story of Victoria 
(Julie Andrews), an out-of-work singer living in Paris during the 1930s.  She meets 
Toddy (Robert Preston), a male performer in a similar situation, and they strike up a 
friendship.  Toddy comes up with a plan to increase both their fortunes – Victoria will 
pretend to be Victor, a female impersonator, and become the toast of Paris.  She 
succeeds, but the appearance of the handsome King Marchand (James Garner) 
complicates her life. Victoria then has to negotiate the tension between her lives as Victor 
and Victoria as well as her growing romantic interest in King.  Through its generic 
categorization as a musical and its use of drag performance, the film serves as a utopia of 
alternatives for audiences.  Furthermore, the many instances of drag performance provide 
ample ground for an examination of the ways in which traditional theories of the gaze 
falter when confronted with atypically-gendered characters and yield fertile ground for 
exploring new ways of seeing.  Victoria’s romantic relationship, however, is problematic, 
and King’s insistence on rigidly-defined gender and sex categories undermines the 
potentially liberating message of the film. Although Victor/Victoria contains elements of 
gender transgression through its exposure of gender as a performance and its disruption 
of the spectatorial gaze, King and Victoria’s relationship undermines the radical potential 
of the film by reinscribing Victoria as a vulnerable, submissive woman. 
Film critic Richard Dyer explains the musical’s effect on audiences by claiming 




  He posits that people, particularly people in marginalized 
groups, experience specific social liabilities such as the lack of community, transparency, 
intensity and energy in their lives.
104
 Furthermore, he claims that Hollywood films not 
only reify the dominant ideology, reflecting back the beliefs of our culture in order to 
present the viewer with a pleasantly realistic diegetic world; they also seek in some ways 
to subvert our ordinary lives, presenting us with a “utopian” version of a seemingly 
realistic life that is full of “alternatives, hopes, [and] wishes.”
105
  In “Performance, 
Utopia, and the ‘Utopian Performative,’” Jill Dolan expands upon Dyer’s thesis.  She 
echoes his discussion of film’s potential to provide alternatives, saying, “Audiences are 
compelled to gather with others” because of their desire to see “moments of 
transformation that might let them reconsider and change the world outside the 
theatre.”
106
  In other words, audiences seek a communal environment where they can 
view a “perfect world,” an idealized, utopian version of the real world in which their 
social lacks are met.  In some cases, the alternatives presented and potential utopias often 
do not only exist within the text but also affect the way in which the viewer perceives the 
film.   In the case of Victor/Victoria and the other films discussed in this thesis, the non-
normative genders of those on stage and screen force both the diegetic viewer and the 
extra-diegetic viewer to reevaluate traditional patterns of viewership.  As discussed in the 
first chapter, films that prominently feature gender performances problematize and often 
negate traditional theories of the gaze.  The alternatives presented in the film are 
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conveyed not only in the film’s content but also in the ways they encourage the audience 
to reexamine gender through their reworkings of the gaze. 
Reflecting on the transformative potential of the alternatives presented in the 
films, Dolan contends that the goal may not be only to live in an imaginary world for a 
few hours but to discover “new ideas about how to be and how to be with each other.”
107
  
People, particularly those in marginalized groups, not only want to experience these 
alternatives while watching a performance but desire to learn to experience the utopian 
alternatives to their marginal existences in their everyday lives.  Dyer has already argued 
that entertainment helps to define our desires, and most media theorists agree that one of 
the ways in which we internalize social codes is through watching movies.  Transgressive 
and subversive entertainment such as drag may help to redefine those codes and desires 
for the audience.  In order to accomplish this task, Dolan argues “a culture has to move 
farther and farther away from the real into a kind of performative, in which the 
utterance… inspires perhaps other more local ‘doings’ that sketch out the potential in 
those feignings.”
108
  The performance, then, must be so extreme, so exaggerated, that a 
more moderate form of the performance could be enacted in everyday life.  However, 
Dyer explains that, because the entertainment films also must be successful with 
mainstream audiences, they must, however problematically, agree with patriarchal 
capitalist ideology.
109
  And so films, particularly musicals and, in this case, particularly 
Victor/Victoria, are simultaneously and complexly full of ironies.  And so films, 
particularly musicals and, in this case, particularly Victor/Victoria, are simultaneously 
and complexly full of ironies.  They fulfill desires that they elicit while both transgressing 
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and reifying the dominant ideology of our culture.  The tensions between alternatives and 
norms are also perceptible in the ways in which the films encourage a reexamination of 
the spectatorial gaze, as the traditional male gaze presented in Mulvey’s “Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema” regains control over the film’s alternative, potentially liberating 
points of view. 
 Thus these three areas – the musical, spectatorship, and drag performance – share 
similar tensions between the conservative and the transgressive, and Victor/Victoria 
provides an excellent instance in which to examine their interplay.  Despite many 
moments in which gender is subverted and rigorously questioned, Victor/Victoria 
ultimately allows heteronormativity to prevail.  Because it is a musical that centers on 
drag performance, its transgressive potential as well as the problems described above 
abound in the film.  We first see the main characters, Toddy and Victoria, experiencing 
marginalized existences.  Toddy, a gay nightclub singer, loses both his job and his lover 
in the first scenes of the film.  Victoria, a single woman, is a singer who cannot find work 
and is hungry to the point of starvation.  Neither are members of the dominant social 
group – heterosexual white males – and the film emphasizes their dire and 
disenfranchised situations.  After fainting with hunger, Victoria decides to dine and dash 
at a fancy restaurant.  There she meets Toddy and, after sharing a luxurious meal 
together, they cause a ruckus and flee the scene.  From the very beginning we see the 
negative situation Dyer describes those in marginalized groups often experience.  Both 
Toddy and Victoria are characterized by extreme lack – they lack energy and abundance, 
lethargically moving through the paces of their impoverished lives, and experience their 
existences largely alone.  Then they find one another, creating a sense of community, and 
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immediately the utopian fantasy begins both for the characters and the audience. 
 Victoria, unable to pay her rent, moves in with Toddy, and he comes up with a plan 
to pull them both out of their misery and into a life of wealth.  Victoria will masquerade 
as Count Victor Grazinski, a female impersonator from Eastern Europe, and Toddy will 
pretend to be his lover.  Victoria nervously agrees, gets a job at a drag club and begins 
practicing for her first performance.  During rehearsal, she learns her choreography from 
a man, swaying her hips and going through the motions stumblingly as he performs them 
effortlessly.  This scene is the first to question the naturalness of gender.  Victoria, a 
female, learns how to “pass” as a female from a man.  As Mock posits in her study of 
drag culture, true femininity seems no longer to exist; all that exists is a mimicry, i.e. 
Victoria, a woman, learning how to be feminine from a man.
110
  As the male 
choreographer so easily performs the feminine choreography while Victoria struggles to 
learn it, we see the first intimation that all gender may in fact be a performance. 
 The excessive, parodic femininity often associated with drag abounds in Victoria’s 
first performance.  She wears a sparkling headdress covered in diamonds, and her dress 
and jewelry are also accented with the jewels.  She is dressed in a sumptuous, flowing 
black gown, and energetic dancers surround her throughout the performance. Just as 
Doane suggests feminist cinema should do, the excessive femininity of the drag 
performances shows that enactments of gender “are poses, postures, tropes” and thereby 
creates an awareness in the viewer “that we are being subjected to a discourse on 
femininity” that works to make those enactments strange and unfamiliar.
111
  In this way, 
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drag performance mirrors Doane’s goal for feminist cinema because it creates “a 
slippage” between “true” femininity and the femininity that is being “mime[d],” 
encouraging recognition that all gender is not innate but constructed.
112
  
 Just before this scene we are introduced to King Marchand, a gangster and 
nightclub owner from Chicago who is coming to see the show.  Shots of Victoria’s 
performance are intercut with King’s reactions.  He is obviously mesmerized by Victoria, 
as his gaze never leaves her, and his mouth hangs slightly agape.  As Mulvey explains in 
“Visual Pleasure,” Victoria is the fetishized object of the gaze, and, as the spectator, King 
controls her through his sexual objectification of her; the beginning of this scene 
inscribes as the norm the active male gaze that looks upon the passive female spectacle.  
King’s girlfriend, Norma (Lesley Ann Warren), pouts throughout the performance, 
visibly irritated by King’s arousal.  Both King and Norma are shocked when, at the end 
of the performance, Victoria removes her headdress and reveals that she is a man.  She 
bows as we see King’s shocked and horrified face.  Norma looks at him, surprised, and 
then jumps out of her seat, cheering and clapping.  Victoria’s destabilization of gender 
through her drag performance undercuts King’s power as the possessor of the gaze.  The 
traditional paradigm of the gaze relies on heterosexual roles – the man is the aggressor 
who looks while the woman is the passive object that receives the look.  But when King 
comes to believe Victoria is male, he loses his power because his sexual interest threatens 
his heterosexuality.  He is horrified to think he is attracted to a man and therefore, by 
extension, is feminine and no longer qualified to hold the position of power.  Conversely, 
Norma is relieved because, knowing King’s dependence upon his heterosexual 
masculinity, she no longer must compete for his affection. 
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 The subversion is incomplete for the viewer of the film, however, because we know 
Victoria is a woman.  As Arthur Noletti, Jr. points out in his discussion of 
Victor/Victoria, only the audience within the film believes the lie because “Julie Andrews 
fails to convince as a man.”
113
  So, although King fears that his masculinity has been 
threatened, the spectator knows it has not been.  This tension between the simultaneous 
subversion and maintenance of the heterosexual paradigm occurs throughout the film due 
to the spectator’s inability to identify fully with many of the characters’ gazes.  In another 
of Victoria’s performances, “The Shady Dame from Seville,” Victoria plays a seductive 
Spanish girl who tempts and teases a stage full of male back-up dancers.  Her clothing 
again reflects the opulence of the utopian fantasy of both the musical and drag.  Her dress 
is full and ruffled, and her hair, makeup and choreography reflect the exaggerated 
femininity associated with drag performance.  For the diegetic viewer, the scene both 
reifies and undermines gender roles and the heterosexual paradigm.  Ostensibly the 
audience in the film sees a woman parading around, reveling in her role as the sexualized 
object of lust of a group of men.  However, their belief that Victoria is a man who is 
convincingly playing a woman problematizes that view, undercutting the notion that 
gender is a natural extension of sex.   
 As such, traditional spectacle/spectator relations cannot apply to the diegetic 
viewers.  Heterosexual male viewers cannot unproblematically fetishize Victoria because 
they think she is actually a man, and any sexualization of her body would threaten their 
heterosexuality as it did King’s.  The female viewer also cannot fit into traditional 
theories of spectatorship because she cannot identify with Victoria’s status as fetishized 
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object nor can she assume the place of the male spectator and sexualize Victoria.  It is 
possible, however, that the female spectator could identify with Victoria’s alternation and 
incongruence.  Because theories of female spectatorship often invoke the rhetoric of the 
transvestite, Victoria’s oscillating gender performance reflects the female spectator’s 
alternating or oscillating subject position and the problematics of theorizing such an 
indeterminate and elusive identity.  By both foregrounding the performativity of gender 
and reflecting the indeterminate and shifting nature of the female spectator, the film’s 
emphasis on drag calls for a reexamination of theories of spectatorship and subverts the 
monolithic power of sex and gender; in other words, to echo Dyer and Dolan’s 
discussions of the role of entertainment, the film provides an alternative to the rigid 
binaries of male/female and masculine/feminine that place women, homosexuals and 
other atypically-gendered people at such a disadvantage.  The film’s spectator, however, 
knows that Victoria is a female, so to a certain extent the subversive power of the 
performance is mitigated. 
 But the spectator of the film does see Victoria in a drag performance; the 
performance is just not on stage.  She dons male clothing throughout the film in order to 
maintain her identity as Count Victor.  King continues to doubt that she is actually male, 
refusing to believe that he could be attracted to a man.  One night, Toddy, King, Victor/ia 
and their friend, Andre, go out to dinner, and eventually King and Victor/ia are left alone.  
Deepening her voice, Victoria performs the part of Victor, conversing comfortably and 
equally with King.  King flirts with him/her, saying flirtatiously, “You light up when you 
smile.”  Victor/ia looks surprised and, maintaining his/her composure, says, “That’s a 
funny thing to say, one man to another.”  For the diegetic viewer, the flirtation is 
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subversive.  Believing Victor/ia to be a man, the viewer would see sexual chemistry in a 
gay couple, undermining the heterosexual norm.  But the spectator knows Victor/ia is a 
woman, which dilutes the subversive power of the scene.  In an attempt to reassure 
himself that he is correct in his assumption that Victor is female, King asks Victor if he 
would like to smoke a cigar, a traditionally masculine object and unquestionably a phallic 
symbol.  Victor nervously agrees but, after a few puffs, sputters and coughs, dousing the 
cigar in a glass of water smirkingly proffered by King.  Satisfied with Victor’s failure of 
this test, King feels more secure in his masculinity. 
 The most subversive performance in the film, however, does not come from 
Victoria.  After their dinner date, King, Victor/ia, Toddy and Andre go to Chez Lui, the 
gay-friendly nightclub where Toddy once performed.  Before they arrive, a group of four 
men come onto the stage.  Two of the men are dressed as women, albeit unconvincingly, 
with all the opulence and exaggeration associated with drag – their makeup is extremely 
heavy, their hair short but meticulously curled, and their dresses sparkling and feminine.  
The other two men, although dressed in the same way, wear masks that look identical to 
the faces of the “women” played by the other two men.  The four sashay out, swaying 
their hips to the music.  Then suddenly the music changes from a swanky, seductive tune 
to a quicker piece.  They turn around, and we see that the men wearing the masks were 
facing backwards and on the front they are dressed and made up as men, wearing tuxedos 
and sporting mustaches.  The backs of the other two men are dressed as men as well but 
sport male masks on the backs of their heads.  Their dance for the male section is much 
stiffer and less feminine; they keep their backs straight, jumping up and down almost as if 
to a march.  The message, while not subtle, is subversive and compelling.  Although all 
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the performers are physiologically male, this performance demonstrates that gender is a 
performative mask.  Because half of the masks are female while half are male, we see 
that, regardless of sex, both genders are ways of appearing and behaving.  The 
performance parodies these masks we call gender, and the exaggeratedly masculine and 
feminine appearances and dances of the drag queens highlight the roles and rules that we 
assign to the arbitrary category of gender. 
 The dancers then pair off and dance as couples.  Sometimes the couples are 
heterosexual, and the spectator can see what appear to be one man and one woman 
dancing together.  However, when their position on stage changes, or if the camera 
moves, we see an apparently homosexual couple of either two men or two women. Their 
sex and gender oscillations align with feminist theories of the female spectator as 
alternating between masculine and feminine subject positions.  The notion of 
positionality is integral to an understanding of gender as performative; as de Lauretis 
explains, gender categories “do not refer so much to qualities or states of being inherent 
in a person” but “to positions which [one] occupies in relation to desire.  They are terms 
of identification.”
114
  Once again, the drag performance mirrors the subject position of the 
female spectator.  The performance highlights the shifting of perspective because a 
change in the position from which one gazes at the dancers creates a different reading not 
only of the dancer (as male/masculine or female/feminine) but also on the coupling of the 
dancers (as heterosexual or homosexual).  This fluidity sends a powerful ideological 
message of an alternative and more liberating view of gender.  Our perception of people 
as either masculine or feminine is not a given but depends upon external factors that 
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condition us to view people a certain way.  Only because we have conceptions of sex and 
gender are we able to identify (or, in the case of drag, to be uncomfortably unable to 
identify) people as members of these categories.  As the changing 
perspectives/positionalities in this scene show, these categories can be destabilized and 
shifted.   
 Luckily for King, however, the film goes on to undermine the subversive potential 
described above.  Both Norma’s nightclub performance and King’s relationship with 
Victoria reinscribe heterosexuality as the norm and reify traditional gender roles by 
placing the woman as the object of the male gaze.  Near the middle of the film, Norma 
returns to Chicago, fed up with King’s coldness toward her.  She gets a job singing and 
dancing at a nightclub, and her performance, although it contains the utopian elements 
that Dyer describes, creates a utopia of normative heterosexual male desire rather than a 
utopia of alternative gender performances.  For her act, Norma dresses as the ideal 
sexualized woman.  Her thin but curvaceous form is clad in a frilly pink dress that 
exposes her cleavage, and she wears pink gloves and heavy makeup.  Her dance is full of 
pelvic thrusts, which she often does in the faces of the men in the audience, whose 
reaction shots are the epitome of what Mulvey describes as the “controlling and curious 
gaze” (717).  They look her body up and down, objectifying and fetishizing every inch of 
her.  In one particularly poignant shot, a man with a giant cigar in his mouth stares at her 
unblinkingly.  This not-so-subtle sexual image confirms the arousing effect Norma has on 
her male audience. 
 As the performance continues, we discover that Norma’s skirt is attached to strings 
above the stage, and it blows up three times, exposing her underwear.  Finally the strings 
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pull off her skirt, and she is left in pink lingerie with frills and bows on the crotch.  The 
men cheer loudly, obviously gratified that their imaginations no longer have to work 
quite so hard, and other scantily clad women come out to join her. At one point during 
the performance they all turn around and bend over, grasping their buttocks and exposing 
their crotches, which are barely concealed by their tiny costumes. Such a display 
indicates that they are consciously performing the role of sexual object.   
 This scene does contain some aspects that feminist critics could identify as 
subversive.  The hyperbolic sexuality and femininity that Norma conveys are certainly 
examples of excess, an attribute that Doane contends can upend traditional spectatorial 
relations by exposing the “performative, gestural nature of femininity.
115
  Particularly 
when compared to the drag performances in the film, Norma’s excessiveness is thrown 
into greater relief – she is just as heavily made-up and ornately dressed as any drag queen 
we see, which again implies to the diegetic viewer and the film spectator that all gender, 
even gender that corresponds to one’s sex, is a performance, a “pose, posture, [or] 
trope.”
116
 Furthermore, the many reaction shots of the aroused male spectators create a 
hyper-awareness of the gaze.  As the spectator watches the diegetic viewers gaze at 
Norma, we see them objectify and fetishize her.  Miriam Hansen points out in Babel and 
Babylon that awareness of scopophilia can undermine the voyeuristic appeal of films and 
produce an acknowledgment of “the gaze as an erotic medium.”
117
  
  In this scene, however, the spectator and the diegetic viewer sit in the same 
spectatorial position.  We cannot identify with the viewers of Victoria’s performances 
                                                     
115
 Desire 34, 181. 
116
 Desire 181. 
117
 Hansen, Miriam, Babel and Babylon: Spectatorship in American Silent Film (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 1991) 280. 
Lawson 68 
because we know she is a woman; we occupy a different subject position from that of the 
spectators in the film.  But here our gaze matches the gaze of those in the film.  Despite 
the awareness of gender as a performance and the strong, explicit presence of the gaze as 
an erotic force, this scene positions the male spectator to join the men in the film in 
fetishizing Norma while positioning the female spectator to either “cross dress” and join 
the men in sexualizing Norma or masochistically identify with her objectification.  In this 
regard, Norma’s performance is the antithesis of the drag performance at Chez Lui.  It 
raises no questions of gender roles or sexuality.  Norma is, as her name suggests, as 
normatively feminine as possible both in appearance and action.  She positions herself as 
the sexual spectacle for the leering men in the audience, and the binary of male/female is 
upheld with heterosexual men in the dominant position and women as the submissive 
objects of desire. 
 Victoria’s relationship with King also undermines much of the film’s gender 
questioning and eventually reinscribes Victoria as a submissive, obedient would-be wife.  
She finds herself attracted to King, and her frustration at her inability to act upon that 
attraction because she is supposed to be Victor is the only major difficulty she has with 
her new, gender-bending life.  King doubts that Victoria is actually a man and goes to 
great lengths to prove she is female.  In one of the best-known scenes of the film, King 
sneaks into Victoria’s hotel room to hide in the bathroom and discover her true sex.  
From the beginning of the sequence, the spectator is cued to identify with King’s 
voyeurism.  We consistently view the action through doorways, playing the role of 
voyeur as we watch King make his way into Victoria’s room to spy on her.  When King 
finally enters her room, the camera is in the darkened bathroom, and the spectator sees 
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him through the lighted doorway.  His bodyguard, Squash, sees him through the window 
from his room, and King looks over at him and waves.  Because King has the power to 
return Squash’s gaze instead of acting as the passive recipient of it, we see that he is not 
the true object of our voyeurism.  Victoria and Toddy enter the room, and King scrambles 
to hide.  We get the same view of Victoria from the doorway as we did of King, 
emphasizing that she has replaced him as the object of our voyeurism. Like King, the 
spectator will clandestinely survey Victoria.   
 King hides in a linen closet in the bathroom, and Victoria enters to undress and 
bathe.  The rest of the scene oscillates between King’s point of view and his reaction 
shots.  From King’s point of view we see Victoria slowly undressing, the closet doors 
blocking out about one third of the frame.  These POV shots are intercut with shots of 
King straining to catch a glimpse of Victoria’s nude body.  However, we do not see these 
shots from Victoria’s point of view.  The camera is not in place of the bathtub but further 
out in the middle of the room.  In this scene of total invasion of privacy, we never see 
from Victoria’s point of view – that of a victim of sexual violation; instead the camera’s 
placements encourage the spectator to adopt the position of voyeur.  The two points of 
view available are those of King watching Victoria and the camera watching King watch 
Victoria.  Our pleasure in looking consequently comes from this double voyeurism.  This 
scene also marks the first time in the film that the spectator’s gaze unproblematically 
identifies with King’s gaze.  Throughout much of the film the spectator has been unable 
to identify with the diegetic viewer due to the diegetic viewer’s lack of awareness that 
Victoria is actually a female.  Consequently, most point-of-view shots, particularly those 
of King watching Victoria’s performances, have not placed the spectator in King’s 
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position; while he is concerned that his attraction to Victoria threatens his 
heterosexuality, the spectator knows that it does not.  In this bathroom scene, however, 
the spectator is positioned to see as King sees and to watch voyeuristically as Victoria 
undresses.   Unlike previous scenes, which undermined traditional theories of the gaze 
and spectatorial identification, this scene places the spectator squarely in the masculine 
position of voyeur. 
 At one point, when Victoria is nearly undressed, she sits down out of King’s view.  
We see his reaction, and he is visibly irritated, furrowing his brow and trying to lean out 
just a little farther so he can see her.  Our available points of view encourage us to 
empathize with his frustration and anticipate the final revelation of her body, but the 
spectator does not see Victoria nude.  She stands up and pulls off her shirt, but all we and 
King can see is her back.  Then the scene cuts back to King, and we hear her step into the 
bathtub.  As she moans and slides down into the water, King smiles, satisfied, and closes 
the door.   The juxtaposition of Victoria’s moan with King’s smile underscores his sexual 
satisfaction with his discovery.  Not only has he confirmed his masculinity and, by 
extension, his heterosexuality, but he has received sexual gratification from seeing 
Victoria nude.  By seeing her exposed, castrated body, he has reaffirmed his dominance 
as a man over her lack.  The scene is disturbing, and Victoria never discovers King’s 
actions, nor does he suffer any consequences.  The truly troublesome aspect of the 
sequence, however, is the spectator’s identification with King.  After wonderful scenes of 
gender transgression and subversion, the spectator is encouraged, as Mulvey says, to 
assume the position of the male spectator and objectify Victoria.  This scene, like 
Norma’s performance, reinscribes dominant, heterosexual masculinity as the position of 
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power and places the woman in the position of the submissive object of the gaze.   
 Soon after this scene, King and Victoria narrowly escape arrest after a brawl breaks 
out at Chez Lui.  They run outside and around the corner to hide from the police.  Out of 
breath, they stare at each other for a moment; then King says, “I don’t care if you are a 
man,” and kisses Victoria.  She pulls back and says, “But I’m not a man.”  King replies, 
“I still don’t care,” and kisses her again.  Presumably, this scene means to show the 
spectator that King has grown by attempting to overcome his heterosexual anxiety.  This 
exchange, however, contains no subversion; on the contrary, it insults Victoria and the 
viewer.  King, safe in the knowledge that the kiss will be heterosexual, transgresses no 
boundaries and does not grow as a character through his final admission of love for 
Victoria.  He merely pretends at such personal growth, lying to Victoria and taking 
advantage of her ignorance of his invasion of her privacy.  The scene encourages the 
spectator to think more highly of King and to create the illusion that he is now more 
open-minded, but the spectator knows he knows Victoria’s true sex, and no other 
characters that are unaware that Victoria is a woman are present.  If another character 
spotted King and Victoria kissing, the spectator might believe that King had grown and 
no longer cared if people thought he was sexually attracted to a man; but in this scene 
King and Victoria are deliberately avoiding the gaze of other characters by hiding from 
the police, so the scene presents another triumph of dominant heteronormative values. 
 In his analysis of the film, Arthur Noletti, Jr. contends that King does in fact 
undergo a change in his attitudes about gender and sex by the end of the film.  He posits 
that, although “King never really feels completely at ease with the knowledge that the 
world is far from straight,” he eventually “see[s] that rigidly defined sex roles are 
Lawson 72 
inherently absurd” and “becomes less preoccupied with stereotypes.”
118
  As the action of 
the film winds to a close, however, King seems no more open-minded than he was before 
his interactions with Victoria and Toddy.  Nowhere is this clearer than in the bedroom 
scene.  King and Victoria have just consummated their relationship, only to be discovered 
by Squash, who is unaware that Victoria is not a man.  King runs out after Squash to 
explain, but before he can, Squash admits his own homosexuality.  A visibly shaken King 
walks back into the bedroom and sits with his back to Victoria and the camera.   
 They then have a long, complex conversation in which Victoria confronts King’s 
small-mindedness.  When she talks about the difficulties they will face due to the fact that 
she is “a woman pretending to be a man pretending to be a woman,” King says, “You can 
stop pretending.”  “And do what?” she asks.  “Be yourself.”  Victoria looks perplexed.  
“And what is that?”  “What do you mean?” King asks, still complacent in his supposedly 
stable identity as a heterosexual man.  He continues, “You’re a woman in love with a 
man,” setting up their relationship as a simple one that falls into the dominant 
heterosexual paradigm.  “But you didn’t finish,” she says.  “A woman in love with a man 
pretending to be a man…” He interrupts her hotly, saying, “I said you can stop 
pretending!”  Like the drag performance at Chez Lui, Victoria acknowledges that all 
gender is performative.  She sees no difference between her life as Victor and his life as 
King.  However, King interrupts her subversion of his masculinity, labeling her 
performance “pretend.” 
 Victoria continues, saying, “But you see, I don’t think I want to.  I’m a big star 
now; I’m a success.”  “Oh, that,” King says dismissively, not acknowledging her 
successful career.  “And something more than that,” Victoria says thoughtfully.  “I find it 
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all really fascinating.  I mean, there are things available to me as a man that I could never 
have as a woman.  I’m emancipated…my own man, so to speak.”  Here, Victoria 
addresses the gender gap and realizes that, although she is still herself, society allows her 
more freedom because of her perceived maleness.  King scoffs at her remarks, and she 
replies that it is important for him to understand her point if they are to have a future 
together.  “Would it be fair,” she asks, “for me to ask you to give up your job?”  “It 
would be ridiculous,” King replies.  Victoria nods and says, “But you expect me to give 
up mine.”  “There’s a difference, for Christ’s sake!” King cries defensively.  Victoria 
smiles sadly and says, “Yes, but there shouldn’t be.”  Even when Victoria forces King to 
recognize and admit the double standard he holds for men and women as well as his 
adherence to gender roles, he refuses to see her point of view.  Their body language and 
clothing in the scene reflect their attitudes toward the subject.  Victoria sits on the bed in 
a man’s white shirt, her body open to the camera and her face very visible.  In contrast, 
throughout the scene King sits with his back both to Victoria and the camera, and we 
never see more than half of his face or the back of his black suit jacket.  Victoria’s light 
clothing and visibility reflect her open mind and freedom, whereas King’s dark clothing 
and closed-off body language reveal his refusal to change his mind. 
 In this scene, the issue goes unresolved.  Norma returns to Paris with one of King’s 
fellow Chicago mobsters in tow, determined to see him ruined for the shame he caused 
her.  To save him, Victoria admits to Norma that she is a woman, and the police find out 
that she has been scamming crowds by masquerading as a female impersonator.  They 
invade the backstage of the nightclub but leave empty-handed, saying there was a man in 
her dressing room.  The sequence then cuts to Victoria entering the lounge of the 
Lawson 74 
nightclub clad in a flowing black evening gown that shows off her cleavage for the first 
time in the film.  Her hair is pulled back and her makeup is light, and her appearance 
contains none of the exaggerated femininity of her drag performance.  Instead of 
questioning gender by enacting an excess of femininity as she did in her drag 
performances, she now makes herself beautiful and sensual.   She no longer transgresses 
gender boundaries; she has become a “normal” woman, and her gender matches her sex.  
She wordlessly walks over and sits next to King.  He tries to question her, but she puts 
her finger to her lips, silencing him as the performance begins. 
 The curtain pulls back and the dancers twirl out of the way to reveal Toddy clad in 
Victoria’s “Shady Dame of Seville” dress, fan in hand.  The audience laughs 
immediately, and Toddy laughingly struggles his way through the routine.  The song does 
not fit in his vocal range, and his scratchy baritone is not convincingly feminine in the 
least.  He struggles with the gown, tripping over it multiple times, and throughout the 
performance it slips further and further off his shoulder, revealing increasing amounts of 
hairy chest.  His choreography is stiff; unable to capture the feminine flow Victoria 
created, he breaks the fan in two when he tries to flip it seductively.  Shots of his 
performance are intercut with the audience laughing uproariously.  Their laughter here 
stands in stark contrast to the reaction shots of an aroused King during Victoria’s initial 
performance, as well as to the reactions of the men in the audience of Norma’s 
performance.  In this scene, drag becomes the non-transgressive parody McNeal and 
Mock described.  Toddy is in no way convincing as a woman, and his failure to perform 
femininity reifies the belief that gender is tied to sex.  Toddy cannot perform as a woman 
because he is a man.  In fact, the only truly convincing female impersonator we see in the 
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film is Victoria.  As Mock said, the audience “laugh[s] at, rather than with” Toddy.
119
  He 
is not in on the joke; he is the joke, as is the notion that gender identity is mutable and 
fluid. 
 Furthermore, this scene marks Victoria’s obedience to King.  Even though 
circumstances beyond her control forced her to quit, she gives up her career as Victor and 
accepts her life as a woman.  Moreover, she does not speak for the remainder of the film, 
which reinscribes her as a powerless female spectator rather than a problematic object of 
the gaze that encourages a questioning of traditional roles.  She sits placidly next to King, 
silently mouthing the words along with Toddy.  This shift from spectacle of excess to 
silenced female spectator coupled with her traditionally feminine appearance repositions 
her into her normative place in society – a submissive, silent, obedient would-be wife.  
She has given up her transgressive, “emancipated” existence as Victor/ia and has lost the 
power that existence afforded her.  During her performances, she problematized 
normative conceptions of gender.  Now, having abandoned that performance, she has lost 
her ability to speak.  She instead bows to the ideology she once transgressed and accepts 
her place next to King. 
 The drag performances in Victor/Victoria present a set of proposed alternatives for 
how to be and how to be with each other.  For marginalized audience members, both 
those in the film and outside of the film, these scenes provide hope for a utopia in which, 
because of the destabilization of sex and gender categories, they might not have to 
experience isolation and ostracization.  For heterosexual audience members, the film 
provides a way out of rigid binary categories, allowing for a more fluid and liberating 
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conception of identity.  The power dynamics between spectator and spectacle also 
provide alternatives for theorizing the spectatorial gaze; the shifting, indeterminate nature 
of Victor/ia’s sex and gender as well as the gender performances of the other drag queens 
undermine and problematize traditional theories of the gaze, allowing for alternative 
theories that rely on gender fluidity rather than rigidity.  The film, however, ultimately 
redefines drag not as a set of alternatives but as a joke and reconfigures Victoria as a 
passive female spectator, replacing heterosexual masculinity to its position of power and 
relegating women to their places as the object of desire and the submissive partner.  The 
film, which has such transgressive potential due to its inclusion of both the musical genre 
















Rewriting Oedipus: Transsexuality, Parent/Child Relations and Spectatorship in 
Transamerica 
Since the 1960s, the road film genre has provided iconic images of Americana.  
From Peter Fonda sailing down the highway in Easy Rider to Bonnie and Clyde racing 
from their crimes, road films connote the American ideals of autonomy, freedom, and a 
search for identity.  Road films have been a primarily masculine genre; the themes of 
independence, aggression and control have painted American identity in stereotypically 
masculine terms.  Since the 1990s, however, a new subgenre has emerged: the queer road 
film.  One such example is Duncan Tucker’s Transamerica (2005), which relates the 
story of Bree, a male-to-female transsexual in the days leading up to and immediately 
following her sexual reassignment surgery.  Excited and relieved to receive the surgery 
after a long wait, Bree is shocked to get a call from a New York City jail on behalf of a 
young man who claims to be her son.  The young man, Toby, is the result of a one-night 
tryst that Bree had in college before she began her life as a woman.  Her therapist grows 
concerned that Bree’s realization of Toby’s existence could have a psychologically 
damaging effect on her, particularly at this critical juncture in her life.  Before the 
therapist agrees to sign off on the surgery, she insists that Bree travel to New York City 
to meet her son.  Bree does so, and the bulk of the film focuses on Bree and Toby’s cross-
country road trip from New York back to her home in California. 
 As Shari Roberts explains, the road film genre partially developed from and 
shares many characteristics with the Western.  In both the Western and the road film, a 
(usually male) protagonist escapes from civilization and social responsibility to find 
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freedom and his true identity on the frontier or the open road, respectively.
120
    Roberts 
explains that Westerns became and remain popular “in part because of Americans who 
desire to re-create a revitalized, and particularly masculinist, national identity through 
popular culture.  The road genre furthers this cultural function.”
121
  Just as Westerns 
feature often-solitary male figures abandoning society in favor of the West, many road 
films explore the journey of a male hitting the road in search of “freedom for life and art, 
and freedom from restrictive traditions, mores, and social norms.”
122
  Roberts discusses 
several films that cross between the genres to explicate their similarities, such as Clint 
Eastwood’s films, Honkytonk Man (1982) in which Red travels to Nashville for an 
audition, and A Perfect World (1993) in which Butch escapes from prison and heads for 
Alaska to outrun the law.
123
  As these examples illustrate, both Westerns and road films 
emphasize masculine independence and freedom from restrictive societal bounds as core 
traits of American identity.   
More recently road films have incorporated female and queer characters.  With its 
emphasis on escaping from rigid social roles and rules, the road film has clear 
implications for women and homosexuals.  Under patriarchy, women and gay men are 
disenfranchised and made other; this has also held true in road films, which, as David 
Laderman says, tend to contain “conservative subtexual attitudes regarding race and 
gender.”
124
  As Roberts notes, women in early road films such as Arthur Penn’s Bonnie 
and Clyde (1967) or Terrence Malick’s Badlands (1973) tend to be sidekicks, riding in 
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the passenger seat while the man takes the wheel, and/or erotic interests, always “bound 
up in the limitations of a male-oriented and -dominated fantasy.”
125
  Furthermore, as 
Robert Lang points out, “buddy” road movies featuring two male characters, from David 
Butler’s Road to Morocco (1942) to John Hughes’ Planes, Trains and Automobiles 
(1987), nearly always feature a scene in which homosexual interest is raised and then 
quickly negated.
126
  But in recent years female and queer characters have become 
increasingly prominent in road films.  Movies such as Ridley Scott’s Thelma and Louise 
(1991), Gus Van Sant’s My Own Private Idaho (1991), and Stephan Elliot’s Priscilla, 
Queen of the Desert (1994) have revised the genre to offer feminist and queer indictments 
of society.  Indeed, Lang contends that, because the road movie derives from a desire to 
capture American culture and identity, “we might say that the queer road movie has 
emerged as a development in the culture and psychoanalytic crisis of gender.”
127
  The 
road film genre has thus been redefined as our modern concept of gender and sexual 
identity grows and is problematized by people who do not fit the heteronormative 
standard. 
With the concept of the road film as an undercurrent to further discussion, this 
chapter explores the ways in which Bree’s journey typifies and diverges from the usual 
norm of the road film.  Road films tend to concern themselves with the crossing of 
borders; in seeking to leave restrictive social norms behind, the protagonist transgresses 
social boundaries, finding an individualized space where he or she can control his or her 
situation.  Bree’s stance on border crossing, however, is ambivalent.  By default her 
                                                     
125
 Roberts 62. 
126
 Lang, Robert, “My Own Private Idaho and the New Queer Road Movies,” The Road Movie Book, Ed. 
Steven Cohen and Ina Rae Hark (New York: Routledge, 1997) 334. 
127
 Lang 343. 
Lawson 80 
transsexual body crosses the border between male and female, leaving her well outside 
the social norm.  But she expresses a strong desire to fall within that norm, to be a proper 
woman, and her road trip mimics her paradoxical situation.  Bree’s border crossing also 
encourages the spectator to look outside of societal norms. By foregrounding the 
spectatorial gaze and reworking the Oedipal scenario, the film ultimately argues that the 
borders of male/female, masculine/feminine, and mother/father are false dichotomies. 
 As discussed in the first chapter, traditional theories of spectatorship have their 
basis in Oedipal conceptions of desire.  The son resolves his desire for the mother 
through his realization of her sexual difference, which in turn results in his castration 
anxiety.  In order to mitigate this anxiety, the male fetishizes the woman, sexualizing her 
form and turning her into a phallic object.  We have seen how films that feature cross-
dressers and drag queens undermine theories of spectatorship because those theories rely 
on rigid gender binaries based squarely on sexual difference.  Drag performance, 
however, blurs the lines between male and female and masculine and feminine, so those 
theories break down.  Transamerica also questions the gaze, but it goes beyond treating 
the symptoms of the Oedipal conflict and attacks the conflict itself.  By problematizing 
not only gendered theories of the gaze but also the Oedipal root of gendered visual power 
relations, Transamerica invites new ways of perceiving and understanding what it means 
to be human. 
 Perhaps most basically, Transamerica disrupts traditional theories of film 
spectatorship by presenting an atypically-gendered and, in this case, -sexed, main 
character. According to Miriam Hansen, one of the ways in which film can disrupt the 
theorized gaze, and in particular the male spectatorial gaze, is by evoking hyper-
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awareness of the gaze coupled with an overt emphasis on the performativity of 
femininity.  Bree aims to be “stealth,” which means she attempts to pass as a woman in 
public and is not open about her transsexuality.  Much of the film examines Bree’s 
attempts to perfect her performance of femininity and her anxiety at the prospect of being 
“read,” or discovered as a transsexual.  The opening shot of the film is not of Bree but 
rather of an instructional video about feminizing one’s voice that Bree is watching. The 
first shot of Bree is the first of many shots in which she is reflected in a mirror.  She 
gazes at her open mouth, checking the shape of her throat in a pink-framed, hand-held 
mirror as she intones, “Ahh,” in her most feminine manner.  We see only her perfectly 
manicured pink fingernail and her lipsticked mouth.   From the beginning, the viewer 
realizes that, for Bree, femininity does not come naturally; she must practice and control 
others’ view of her as a woman by mimicking, as Doane terms it, the “initial mime.”  
The scene continues with a montage of Bree’s preparations for the day, which 
include putting on pantyhose, body-shaping underwear and a pink dress suit, painting her 
nails, fixing her hair, and applying blush and lipstick. The scene is, as Rebecca Scherr 
noted, “an almost classic study of gender performativity” that highlights the 
unnaturalness of femininity by exposing how much work is involved in looking like a 
woman.
128
  Bree offers an exaggerated, almost-parodic model of femininity – everything 
she has, from her lipstick to her mirror, is pink, emphasizing her desperation to appear 
feminine.  We are, as Doane anticipates, “subjected to a discourse on femininity”; all of 
her actions are typical of society’s expectation for women’s appearances.
129
  She is 
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carefully made up, manicured and coiffed and is wearing an already-archaic stereotype of 
feminine clothing.  The montage, however, includes one action most women do not have 
to perform when getting ready in the morning.  While putting on her underwear, Bree 
pauses to tuck her penis.  The viewer realizes that, despite her appearance, Bree is not 
biologically female.  The contrast between her highly feminine appearance and her 
anatomical sex highlights the performativity of gendered appearance and problematizes 
the spectator’s relationship to her; because Bree looks like a woman but the spectator 
knows she is anatomically male, the spectator cannot easily gaze at or identify with her as 
either a man or a woman. As a result, both male and female spectators experience the 
“slippage” or “oscillation” often ascribed to female spectators, sliding through the cracks 
within the rigid binaries of sex and gender. 
Before Bree leaves the house, as she does in nearly every scene that precedes her 
entrance into the public world, she double-checks her appearance in the mirror.  Her self-
reflexivity and awareness of herself as an object of the gaze heightens the spectator’s 
awareness of his or her own voyeurism; even if Bree does not know the film viewer is 
watching her, she knows those in the diegetic world are watching her closely.   This 
foregrounding of the gaze and, in particular, Bree’s awareness of herself as an object of 
the gaze, coupled with the spectator’s knowledge that Bree is not anatomically a woman 
problematizes traditional theories of spectatorship.  The male gaze cannot function 
because objectifying and/or fetishizing Bree threatens the male spectator’s 
heterosexuality.  Likewise, female spectators cannot cross-identify with the male 
spectator’s objectification of Bree nor can they masochistically identify with her status as 
object. Critics Peter Caster and Allison Andrew, however, argue the opposite. They 
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contend that Bree’s “constant effort to conform to conventional femininity is the subject 
of the film, and she is thus the object of the audience’s gaze, looked at rather than looking 
in a longstanding convention of female representation famously critiqued by Laura 
Mulvey”
130
  For Caster and Andrew, the fact that the audience knows Bree is biologically 
male negates the problematize “transgender gaze” explored by Judith Halberstam in her 
analysis of The Crying Game and leaves traditional film spectatorship fully intact; 
according to Halberstam the spectator’s lack of knowledge that a character is transgender 
produces a transgender gaze by encouraging unwitting spectatorial identification with a 
transgender character.  I would argue, however, that Transamerica’s forthrightness in 
communicating to the spectator that Bree is anatomically male problematizes the 
spectator’s gaze just as much as does a surprise revelation, in a film such as in The 
Crying Game. Because we know Bree is male and our society values sex over gender as a 
person’s defining trait, she cannot unproblematically be, as Caster and Andrew argue, the 
object of the gaze. The spectator’s relationship with her is more complex.  The 
spectator’s knowledge that Bree is transsexual foregrounds the performativity of gender.  
Unable to suture his or her gaze to the gazes of other characters in the film who do not 
possess this knowledge, the spectator identifies with Bree and her determination to 
perform femininity convincingly rather than seeing her as a sexualized object of the gaze. 
As Bree leaves her home, the spectator’s awareness of her fear of the gaze 
increases.  Dressed head-to-toe in pink, she wears large sunglasses and a floppy hat to 
hide her face.  When she walks by her neighbors, she tips her head so that the brim of her 
hat occludes her face.  When a man smiles kindly at her at the bus stop, she again ducks 
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so that her face is obscured.  In the subsequent scene at the doctor’s office, she explains 
that she tries to “blend in” and “keep a low profile.”  For Bree, going unnoticed means 
avoiding too close a gaze.  Her face, although heavily made up, is still rather masculine.  
Despite her concerted efforts to perform femininity adequately, if one looks too closely 
and critically, her performance can be read as just that – a performance.  As in the case of 
the characters in the other films discussed in this study, Bree’s biological sex does not 
correlate to her gendered performance.  When the dominant ideology holds that sex and 
gender are naturally connected, such incongruence can be dangerous; later in the film we 
meet Bree’s parents and see firsthand the intolerance she must deal with because of her 
transsexuality.   
Until her surgery near the movie’s end, the film continues to foreground the 
power of the gaze by emphasizing Bree’s fear of being “read.”   While stopped at a café 
on her way back to Los Angeles, Bree’s fears are realized.  A little girl turns in her seat 
and stares at Bree.  A medium close-up shot of the girl’s quizzical expression, her head 
cocked to one side, is followed by the question Bree and many stealth transpeople dread: 
“Are you a boy or a girl?”  A look of horror crosses Bree’s face as the girl’s mother 
scolds her.  The scene then cuts to a close-up of Bree’s tear-streaked face at a pay phone.  
She calls her therapist, wailing, “A little girl just read me!”  Her extreme distress at the 
girl’s discovery belies her personal conservativism.  Throughout the film, Bree attempts 
to be a prim and proper “real” woman at all times.  In an early scene, Bree is at home 
telemarketing.  As she dials the number, she practices her feminine voice and identifies 
herself as a woman on the phone.  Even in an anonymous situation in the privacy of her 
own home, Bree wants to be a “true” woman.  This scene contrasts with a later scene in 
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which she and Toby stay at the home of a transgendered woman who is a mutual friend 
of her therapist.  As Bree and Toby enter, she is shocked to find a transgendered support 
group meeting.  When Bree nervously tells Mary Ellen she thought she was stealth, Mary 
Ellen replies, “I am in public, but this is the privacy of my home.” For Mary Ellen and 
the other transpeople at the meeting, the stealth performance can lapse when among 
close, accepting friends. Bree, however, is determined to maintain her femininity even 
when away from the judgmental public gaze.  
Transamerica not only foregrounds the performativity of gender and the power of 
the gaze; it presents multiple gazes at Bree, multiple points of view on her body, that 
allow the spectator varying levels of identification that reflect a growing awareness of 
Bree’s reality.  The first point of view we see is that of the medical gaze.  Bree is nearing 
the date of her surgery and must obtain all the necessary signatures from medical 
professionals in order to go through with the procedure.  The scene in which Bree hides 
from her neighbors’ gazes overlaps seamlessly with the scene at the doctor’s office.  We 
transition from the unknowing gazes of those on the street to the knowledgeable gaze of 
the doctor who, like the spectator, knows that Bree is a transsexual.  He asks, “Are you a 
happy person?”  “Yes,” Bree replies.  “I mean, no.  I mean, I will be.”  The doctor looks 
over his glasses at her and assures her that there are “no right answers in this office.”  He 
proceeds to explain that gender dysmorphic disorder, with which one must be diagnosed 
in order to receive sexual reassignment surgery, is “a very serious mental disorder.”  The 
doctor’s point of view, then, presents the scientific opinion on transsexuality – Bree is 
sick.  The scene brilliantly illustrates the difficulties Judith Butler discusses in Undoing 
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Gender.  Bree must “conform to the language of the diagnosis” of gender dysmorphic 
disorder.
131
   
Although the doctor tells her there are no right answers, that is a lie, and Bree 
knows it.  She flounders, changing her answer to his question, trying to give the response 
that will ensure his signature.  In response to his reminder that gender dysmorphia is a 
serious mental disorder, Bree replies, “Don’t you find it odd that plastic surgery can cure 
a mental disorder?”  This sarcastic statement makes it clear that Bree is unconvinced that 
her condition constitutes mental illness.  This is the conundrum Butler describes: Bree 
must maneuver so that the doctor will diagnose her with a disorder that she does not 
believe she has and that many people find offensive.  Bree’s statement is the final line of 
scene; she gets the last word.  The medical gaze is one with which the audience could 
possibly identify.  Unlike many other characters in the film, the doctor knows that Bree is 
transsexual just as the viewer does.  Furthermore, his point of view is one of authority; 
his is the accepted scientific opinion on transsexuals.  But Bree answers back, defying 
this medical view, and the rest of the film continues to establish Bree as someone who is 
neither crazy nor mentally ill. 
Additionally, Bree’s road journey, which mirrors her experience with the medical 
gaze, contradicts the traditional queer road film paradigm.  When Bree tells her therapist 
about the phone call from Toby, her therapist insists she travel to see him.  As noted 
above, the therapist is concerned that Bree’s discovery of her son will harm her mental 
health and refuses to sign off on the surgery unless Bree agrees to visit him.  In his 
analysis of queer road films, Lang asserts that, “The symbolism of ‘the road’ as the 
freedom from constraints…has a correspondence, first of all, in the gay affirmation of 
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sexuality: of sexuality as a celebration of the body and the senses.”
132
  For Bree, however, 
the road trip is a necessity, not a chosen escape.  Characters in road films cross societal 
boundaries and experience liberation outside of normative constraints, but this road trip is 
forced upon Bree by the medical community, as is her diagnosis of gender dysmorphic 
disorder: she must again conform to the medical language, fulfilling her therapist’s 
request in order to receive her surgery.  She is uncomfortable with her body and with 
Toby, a reminder of her abnormal sexuality and physicality as he is the result of sex she 
had when she was Stanley; her discomfort with the road trip reflects her discomfort with 
her border crossing.  She grudgingly agrees to travel to New York and eventually brings 
Toby home with her. 
 As Bree embarks on her road trip with Toby, the film provides another, more 
traditional gaze – the male gaze.  She stops at a gas station in a rural town, filling up the 
car with her back to the building.  On the porch stand a group of men who stare at her.  
She turns to go inside and pay and is visibly uncomfortable with their attention.  As 
always, she ducks her head and hurries past them, eager to escape their gaze.  As she 
walks past them and into the building, several turn their heads to watch her walk away. 
To the men, Bree’s cosmopolitan appearance stands in stark contrast to their rural 
surroundings; indeed, the men are dressed in stereotypically rural clothing such as 
overalls. To them, Bree reads as an urban woman. Unlike in the scene in the diner, Bree’s 
performance presumably passes here.  Although it takes a different form, this gaze holds 
just as much power in this scene as in the diner scene.  The men are dominant, and their 
presence poses a potential threat.  The scene contains a subtextual threat of heterosexual 
rape as she is a woman alone in a remote area with several men, and/or their discovery of 
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her transsexuality could be dire indeed.  Rural middle America is known for its 
homophobia and bigotry, and instances of violence against atypically gendered people 
often occur in such settings; Brandon Teena's rape and murder, which will be discussed 
in my analysis of Kimberly Peirce’s Boys Don’t Cry (1999), is one such example.  Bree 
ducks to avoid them, hiding from their gaze.  But just as with King’s initial fetishization 
of Victoria in Victor/Victoria, the viewer cannot identify with the men on screen.  This 
scene consequently foregrounds both the act of looking and the performativity of gender.  
Because the spectator knows Bree is transsexual and a main focus of the film is on her 
atypical sexuality, our awareness of others’ gazes at her is heightened.  Furthermore, the 
spectator’s inability to identify unproblematically with the men’s gaze increases the 
spectator’s awareness that the men are looking at her.  Unable to see Bree as the men do, 
the spectator is less likely to be swept up in the narrative, as Mulvey argues is often the 
case, and to ignore their gaze.  Such awareness of a usually unconscious and unnoticed 
act disrupts the monolithic power of the gaze.  The fact that the men read her as female 
underscores the fact that gender does not necessarily follow naturally from sex.  Her 
performance works, and the spectator gets a glimpse into traditional male/female 
relations. 
 In the final third of the film, we are presented with another view of Bree.  
Penniless and without a vehicle, Bree grudgingly visits her family to ask for money in 
order to make it home in time for her surgery.  She knocks, and her parents answer the 
door.   Her father does not recognize her, so she says quietly, “It’s me, Dad.”  Her mother 
gasps in horror and slams the door.  Bree knocks again, and her mother rushes her in, 
saying, “Get in before the neighbors see you!”  As Bree talks to her parents, it becomes 
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clear why she told the doctor in an earlier scene that her family was dead.  Her mother is 
controlling, disrespectful and disapproving of Bree and her sexuality.  This initial 
encounter not only reflects the often emotionally painful experiences of transsexuals but 
also the power of the gaze.  Bree’s mother shuts the door on Bree, concealing her from 
sight.  Seeing her “son” living as a woman is unbearable because she subscribes to the 
belief that gender follows from sex.  Bree’s image is painful because it challenges that 
belief and, as her mother says, she “can’t even look at [her].” 
 The tension between Bree and her mother continues throughout her visit.  When 
they go out to eat, her mother stands behind her chair and stares pointedly at Bree.  
Steaming, Bree reluctantly pulls out her mother’s chair.  Her mother simply cannot 
accept that Bree is a woman and insists upon forcing traditional male gender roles on her.  
After an uncomfortable dinner, Bree comes home and expresses her feelings to Toby.  “I 
wish just once they’d look at me and see me,” she says.  “Just once.  Really see me.”  
Bree here redefines what it means to see someone.  She does not want her parents to look 
at her and see her physical body that, until after her surgery, will not coincide with her 
gender.  Instead she wants them to see the person she is emotionally and mentally; in 
short, she wants them to see Bree, not Stanley.  She privileges the gender she performs 
over the sex with which she was born, inverting the binary by making gender the defining 
term.  However, Bree’s family cannot leave Stanley behind.  Although her mother 
apparently becomes more comfortable with Bree over time, hugging and comforting her 
when Toby runs away, the tension remains.  As Lang points out, “The queer road movie 
protagonist’s specific dissatisfaction with home and family invariable has to do with the 
fact that the traditional family is a heterosexual/patriarchal structure which does not 
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acknowledge (his) desire… he has no place in the traditional family.”
133
  Bree’s family 
cannot accept her desire to be a woman because it does not fit into their narrow, 
conservative, traditional family.  The film makes it clear that Bree abandoned them 
because of their refusal to accept her new lifestyle.  Once again Bree leaves her family 
for of the solitary road, where she is free to express herself away from their restrictive 
social mores. 
 Bree may not change the way her mother sees her.  The spectator who has 
followed Bree throughout her journey, however, has seen the real her.  We have watched 
her struggle with her discomfort with her transsexuality as well as with her new status as 
mother/father to Toby.  Whereas Bree’s mother can’t look at her, the spectator has been 
seeing her for over an hour and learning about the uncomfortable realities of life as a 
transsexual person.  In short, the spectator has come to identify with Bree.  In 
contradiction to Mulvey’s claim that the female character blocks and impedes the flow of 
the narrative, Bree is our active protagonist, and the spectator experiences the story 
through her eyes. Bree not only disrupts traditional theories of the gaze but also Mulvey’s 
narrow conception of woman's role in the narrative.  Her mother’s view of her as an 
unnatural freak comes off as intolerant and offensive; however, this view is the likely 
result of the first view the spectator was presented – the scientific view that sees Bree as 
mentally ill.  The medical perspective holds that sex should follow naturally from gender. 
Bree’s gender is feminine, and she wants her body to match the way she feels, but the 
scientific community pathologizes this desire, and Bree must receive the diagnosis of 
gender dysmorphic disorder in order to qualify for sexual reassignment surgery. The 
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medical community holds the same view of Bree that her mother does, although less 
openly and rudely so: she is a freak.  
 As demonstrated above, Transamerica successfully problematizes gendered 
theories of the gaze both by emphasizing gender performativity and self-consciously 
foregrounding the power of looking.  But rather than only dealing with the symptoms of 
gender, the film deals with the root – the Oedipal conflict.  Traditional theories of 
spectatorship rely on strict sex and gender binaries and the Oedipal conflict.  When 
children are born, they experience oneness with their mother.  This sense of 
connectedness is broken during the mirror stage when the child realizes that he or she is a 
distinct person separate from the mother.  Male children experience another break when 
they discover that the mother does not have a penis.  Terrified of castration, the male 
seeks to mitigate his discomfort by fetishizing women.  He begins to identify with the 
father and feels that he must compete with the father for the mother’s attention.  As the 
male child grows, his desire for the mother is replaced with a desire for other women, but 
the tendency to fetishize remains.  The Oedipal scenario relies on strict sexual and gender 
norms of male/masculine and female/feminine as well as on an assumed heterosexuality, 
and theories of spectatorship that use the Oedipal conflict as their basis rely on those 
norms as well.  As we have seen, Bree’s transsexuality disrupts “normal” spectatorship.  
Because Transamerica deals with an atypically-gendered mother/father and her/his son, 
the disruption is even deeper. 
 Most of the elements of the Oedipal conflict are present but decentered in 
Transamerica.  Bree is deeply uncomfortable with the fact that she has a son because he 
serves as a reminder of her life as Stanley.  Uncertain how to handle Toby, she does not 
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tell him that she is transsexual nor that she is his father; instead she pretends to be a 
woman from a church sent to help young people in trouble.  She eventually agrees to 
drive him to California with her, and early on in their trip, he tries to seduce her.  While 
she is in the bathroom, he lays seductively on the bed in nothing but a small pair of 
underwear.  The camera pulls in tight on his face and keeps the rest of his body in frame.  
He looks down and adjusts himself so he will look his best for Bree when she comes back 
into the room.  Toby sexualizes himself, becoming the object of the gaze both for Bree 
and for the spectator.  The camera shoots him from the same direction from which Bree 
will enter, so the spectator identifies with Bree’s gaze.  Toby is thus objectified in a way 
that Bree never is, and throughout the film we learn that he feels the only thing he is good 
for is sex.  This scene inverts the binary, and the male becomes the sexualized object 
whose purpose is merely to provide sexual pleasure to others.  However, this scene goes 
further than inverting the binary, questioning and categorizing as unhealthy the position 
of sexual object. Toby is consistently presented as a damaged young man, particularly 
when it comes to sexuality. In this scene and several others, Toby positions himself as a 
sexual object and seems to feel sex is the only contribution he can make – from 
repeatedly coming on to Bree to turning tricks for money, Toby is an unstable, broken 
boy due to his limited self-understanding as sexual object. Transamerica does not merely 
supplant male for female as sexual object. It instead shows the dangerous consequences 
of such an unhealthy subject position. 
In addition to destabilizing the binary and presenting a male as the object of both Bree 
and the spectator’s gaze, this scene also invokes the Oedipal conflict.  Just like Oedipus 
in the Greek myth, Toby is unaware that the woman he is seducing is his parent.  Like all 
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of the other aspects of the Oedipal complex presented in the narrative, however, this one 
is inverted.  Although Bree is biologically Toby’s father, her life as a man is over and she 
instead refers to herself as his mother.  In this scene, Toby is unknowingly seducing his 
mother, just as in the Oedipus myth, but she is actually his father.  Furthermore, we later 
learn that Toby’s stepfather frequently sexually abused him. Toby left his home for New 
York City in order to escape his stepfather, and the film implies that such abuse is 
responsible for Toby’s unhealthy relationship towards sex, as he has learned from his 
stepfather that he is a tool for the pleasure of others.  So not only does Toby make sexual 
advances to Bree, his mother/father, he has been forced into repeated sexual contact with 
the man who assumed the role of his father.  The film not only inverts the traditional 
notion of the female object of the gaze by sexualizing Toby and casting him as sex 
object, but it also complicates the Oedipal foundation of traditional theories of the gaze. 
Toby’s discovery that Bree is biologically male further complicates the Oedipal conflict.  
One night on a long stretch of highway, Bree has to urinate.  She reluctantly pulls over to 
the side of the road and squats down.  Throughout their rural jaunts she has been 
frightened of encountering snakes and looks around nervously.  She hears a strange noise 
and stands up, afraid a snake is drawing near.  As she stands, a car comes up the highway 
behind her.  Toby, who is still in the car, adjusts the rearview mirror.  He looks into it and 
sees Bree holding her penis and urinating, silhouetted against the other car’s headlights.  
He is shocked but says nothing when Bree reenters the car.  The scene presents a parallel 
to the male child’s discovery that the mother is without a penis and the resultant 
castration anxiety.  However, here the male child is horrified to discover that his 
“mother” (although he does not yet know she is his parent) has a penis.  Ironically, it is 
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Bree’s quest to become a female that results in Toby’s discovery.  She tells him while in 
the car that her hormone therapy is a diuretic, so one reason she needs to relieve herself is 
the medication she takes for her sex change.  If she were not transitioning into a woman, 
Toby might never have discovered that she is not already biologically female.  
Additionally, she stands up because she is frightened of snakes.  Not only is such a fear 
stereotypically feminine, but the snake is a common phallic symbol.  She stands and 
exposes her penis because she is afraid of a metaphorical penis.  Such irony reflects the 
complexity of the transsexual body, underscoring the notion that traditional binary 
patterns of thinking cannot theorize the transgender subject. 
The mechanism of Toby’s discovery is complex and provocative.  His gaze is indirect – 
he sees only Bree’s reflection – and it is unclear whether or not he is actually attempting 
to look at her, the approaching car, or is merely adjusting the mirror.  This is one of the 
many times that we see Bree’s reflection; throughout the film she is continually checking 
her hair and makeup to ensure that she appears as feminine and beautiful as possible, to 
make certain her gendered performance is complete.  Here, in yet another reversal, her 
reflection in the eyes of another exposes her femininity as a performance.  Because the 
“mother” is revealed to possess a phallus, Toby finds himself in complex, untheorized 
territory.  Traditional theories of spectatorship are almost wholly reliant on the Oedipal 
conflict and the gendered binaries and power relations it produces.  There is no way with 
the tools at our disposal to explain Toby’s indirect, probably unintentional gaze. He is 
visibly shaken by his discovery, but Freud's descriptions of the male child's emotional 
state at the sight of his mother’s genitals as deployed by Mulvey in her analysis of 
spectatorship does not apply in this case.  Toby’s lack of castration anxiety renders 
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fetishization unnecessary, just as Bree’s transsexuality problematizes fetishization for the 
spectator.  In the film as a whole, and in this scene in particular, the spectator escapes 
from the oppressive regimes that govern most forms of film spectatorship.  Because 
Transamerica redefines what it means to “see” as looking at one’s gender presentation 
rather than his or her anatomical sex, the film allows for an individualized gaze 
determined by the gender politics of each spectator.
134
 
Although Toby is angry, the root of his anger is not Bree’s transsexuality but 
rather her lack of transparency.  The next day, the two stop at a roadside souvenir stand.  
Toby is upset and behaving poorly, and Bree tells him to control himself.  The male 
proprietor of the stand tells him to listen to his mother, and he responds, “She’s not my 
mother! She’s not anybody’s mother! She’s got a dick! She’s a fucking lying freak!”  The 
man looks at Bree and flips his sunglasses down over his eyes in an interesting 
commentary on spectatorship and the transsexual.  He first saw Bree as a woman, and 
gazed at her accordingly.  Now that he knows she is transsexual, however, he seeks to 
hide evidence of his gaze.  As they return to the car, Toby explains that he is not upset 
that Bree has a penis but rather that she was not honest with him.  Wounded, he says, 
“You knew all about me.”  Throughout the film, Toby has been very open with his own 
atypical sexuality.  He has been arrested in New York City for prostitution; when he and 
Bree first meet, he wants to go to California with her  so he can star in gay pornography; 
he attempts to seduce Bree several times, even after he learns she is transsexual; and his 
step-father sexually abused him.  What makes Bree a “freak” to Toby is that she was not 
honest with him.  Her conservativism and her determination to be stealth at all times 
rather than her status as a transsexual renders her unnatural in his opinion. 
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Late in the film the final piece of the Oedipal puzzle falls into place as Bree 
finally tells Toby she is his father.  While they are staying at her parents’ house, he comes 
into her bedroom and once again attempts to seduce her.  He disrobes and says, “I think 
you’re sexy, Bree.  It’s like I see you,” and he then kisses her.  He presents himself as 
that which she desires most: someone who thinks she is attractive and who accepts her 
for who she is.  In stark contrast to the way her parents “see” her, looking at her physical 
body and seeing someone who is a freak, he sees and is attracted to who she is as a 
person.  Again, the male child is expressing love and desire for the mother.  Bree, 
however, disrupts the Oedipal play by admitting that she was his father, Stanley.  Toby is 
stunned and angry, fleeing the house after striking Bree.  He is presumably upset that she 
lied again as he has already accepted her transsexuality.  Just as when he discovered she 
had a penis, he is hurt by her lack of honesty, not scandalized by her body.  Earlier in the 
film Bree described the openly transsexual women they stayed with as “ersatz,” or 
“something pretending to be something it’s not.”  However, ultimately Toby finds Bree 
to be ersatz as a result of her denial of Stanley. 
Overall, by foregrounding the realities of transgendered life, disrupting the traditionally 
gendered gaze, and transforming the Oedipal conflict, Transamerica allows the spectator 
a way out of sex and gender binaries. As Judith Butler explains in Undoing Gender, 
transpeople are “at the limits of intelligibility;” they inhabit the fringe of what 
mainstream society deems human.
135
 However, the film goes to great lengths to present 
Bree as she wishes her parents could see her – not as a freak, not as someone who is 
mentally ill, but as a human. In the end, Bree has her surgery and is pleased with her new 
body, but she is heartbroken by her loss of Toby. Immediately following her surgery, she 
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breaks down and weeps, much to the surprise of her therapist. “I thought you said this 
would be the happiest day of your life!” the therapist exclaims. But Bree has realized that 
what has arguably held her back throughout the film – her conservativism, her 
desperation to perfect her performance of femininity down to her anatomy, her fear of 
discovery – has prevented her from making connections with others. As Gayle Salamon 
explains, Bree discovers that her sense of self comes not only from her body but from 
loving and desiring others.
136
  Toby eventually comes to visit her and they continue to 
develop the untraditional parent-child bond they established over the course of their 
relationship. Although Bree has no place in a traditional family, she and Toby have 
crossed borders of sex, sexuality, and the Oedipal scenario together and are able to form a 
new, queer family, breaking free of the heteronormative mold.  Just as desire is unique 
and cannot easily be categorized, so we come to see Bree not just as a transsexual but as a 
person, and her journey across sex and gender boundaries mirrors that of the spectator. 
By encouraging the spectator to slip through the cracks between sex and gender, the film 
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Chapter Five 
“I seen him in the full flesh”: Reexamining the Gaze in Boys Don’t Cry 
The transgender body is a place of contention and debate.  Outside of sex and 
gender binaries, it emerges as a site at which one can examine the way those binaries are 
formed and performed.  Kimberly Pierce’s film, Boys Don’t Cry (1999), is a fictionalized 
account of the life and murder of Brandon Teena (Hilary Swank), a transgender young 
man.  Brandon befriends a group of young people and lives with them for a few weeks in 
Falls City, Nebraska.  Among them is Lana Tisdel (Chloë Sevigny), with whom Brandon 
has a romantic relationship.  Eventually two of Lana’s friends, John Lotter (Peter 
Sarsgaard) and Tom Nissen (Brandon Sexton III), discover that Brandon is biologically 
female and rape and murder him. The film won critical acclaim, and Hilary Swank 
nabbed an Oscar for her portrayal of Brandon.  However, recent critics have questioned 
whether or not Pierce adequately conveys Brandon’s story. Analyses of the film have 
tended to focus on the ways in which Brandon’s transgender identity affects the 
spectatorial and the ways in which various characters within the film see him.  Because 
the film focuses so heavily on Brandon’s gender performance, which for most of the film 
remains unknown to the other characters, the spectator cannot suture his or her gaze to 
those other characters.  As a consequence, the film foregrounds the power of the gaze and 
the danger of an inadequate performance.  Of particular interest is Lana’s gaze.  Through 
an examination of Brandon’s gender performance as well as pivotal interactions between 
Lana and Brandon, this essay argues that, although her understanding of and relationship 
with/to Brandon’s body fluctuates throughout the film, Boys Don’t Cry ultimately 
preserves the complexity of the transgender body through Lana’s gaze.  
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Much like Transamerica, Boys Don’t Cry focuses on the transgender main 
character’s gendered performance and desire to avoid discovery.  Much like the first 
scene from Transamerica in which we see Bree get dressed, Brandon also affects his 
masculine performance physically by suppressing his female body in order to pass as 
male.  We first see Brandon in the trailer where he is living with his friend, Lonny.  
Lonny is cutting Brandon’s hair, and Brandon instructs him to cut it shorter.  When 
Lonny replies it is short enough, Brandon stands and fixes his hair in the mirror, saying 
softly, “Wow,” and smiling at his reflection.  He is wearing a plaid men’s shirt and men’s 
jeans and, with his new masculine haircut, very successfully passes as a man.  However, 
Lonny gazes at Brandon’s crotch and reports that his fake bulge, which he has created 
from a pair of socks, is “frightening” and “looks like a deformity.”  Much like Bree’s 
gender performance, Brandon must not only manipulate his hair and clothing; he must 
also manipulate the appearance of his genitals.  Whereas Bree tucked her penis, Brandon 
creates a fake one.  Brandon hurriedly removes and rearranges the socks, eager to look as 
realistically male as possible. 
Brandon’s manipulations of his body continue and are again highlighted about 
halfway through the film.  While staying with his new friend, Candace (Alicia Goranson), 
we see him emerge from the shower and enter his bedroom.  His towel is wrapped around 
his upper body, hiding his breasts, and he pulls out a tampon and surreptitiously inserts it.  
This is not the first time we have seen Brandon struggle with menstruation; earlier in his 
stay with Candace, his period began, and he had to wash out his clothing in the bathroom 
sink to remove the blood.  He then had to secretly search for and eventually steal pads 
from a local store in order to maintain his masculine performance.  Such emphasis on 
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menstruation highlights the difficulty of the life of a pre-operative transsexual, if that is 
indeed how we can characterize Brandon, who, several times throughout the film, 
despairs about the high cost of sexual reassignment surgery.  Although he can make his 
body appear masculine through his mode of dress, he is still biologically female, and that 
fact is eventually Brandon’s undoing.  After he has inserted the tampon, he hides the 
wrapper under the mattress, a choice that will later prove to be a mistake.  He then straps 
down his breasts with an Ace bandage and dresses in men’s clothes.  He again puts a pair 
of socks in his underwear to create a bulge, checking in the mirror to make sure it looks 
realistic, all the while mugging at his reflection and smiling at what he sees.  Overall it is 
clear from his mannerisms that he is pleased with the way he looks and is getting more 
and more comfortable appearing and behaving as a man. 
Brandon’s performance is not relegated to his physical appearance; he also 
behaves masculinely throughout the film.  In the commentary on the film’s DVD release, 
director Kimberly Pierce stated that she was very impressed with the way Brandon 
treated women, and his sense of chivalry is reflected in his interactions with the women 
in his life.
137
  Early in the film, Brandon goes on a date with a young woman at a skating 
rink.  When they leave, he walks her home and kisses her goodnight, saying, “I’m going 
to stand right here until you’re safe inside.” He then waits and watches until she enters 
her home before he leaves, overjoyed with his successful date.  He repeats this action 
later, walking a drunk Lana home to make sure she arrives safely.  Such respectful acts 
reflect the particular type of masculine performance Brandon affects.  His brand of 
masculinity stands in stark contrast to the more brutish masculinity of other male 
characters in the film such as John Lotter.  In one scene, John barges into Lana’s room 
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unannounced while she is fixing her hair and sits on her bed, despite her verbal indication 
that she is uncomfortable with his rude entrance and continued presence.  Brandon, on the 
other hand, is kind and generous, treating women with admiration rather than a desire to 
dominate.  The young women Brandon encounters respond well to such good will; his 
first date smiles gratefully at him when he announces his intentions to watch until she 
gets inside and gazes back at him lovingly as she walks away.  Indeed, he tells Lonny that 
all the girls he has dated say he’s “the best boyfriend they’ve ever had.”  As such, one 
key to Brandon’s masculine performance is his protective, doting, chivalrous manner 
with women. 
In addition to his chivalry, Brandon also acts tough and macho in order to prove 
his masculinity and fit in with John and his friend, Tom Nissen.  His first masculine 
display comes when he meets Candace at a bar.  After flirting with her for a few 
moments, Brandon vacates his bar stool next to her to go buy her some cigarettes.  When 
he does, a large man takes his seat and begins to talk to Candace.  She is visibly 
uncomfortable, says the seat is taken and asks him to leave.  He refuses, and Brandon 
returns to the bar.  “Excuse me,” he says.  “Why don’t you leave the lady alone? I don’t 
want any trouble here.”  In keeping with his chivalrous attitude toward women, Brandon 
assumes the masculine role of the protector, coming to Candace’s aid to fend off this 
man’s unwanted advances.  The man stands up, scoffs at Brandon’s thinly veiled threat 
and calls him a “fag” as he shoves him back.  Brandon strikes back, and they scuffle until 
the some other bar patrons, including John, break up the fight.  Brandon strains at John’s 
hold, desperate to continue his battle.  John, Candace and Brandon escape as the entire 
bar erupts in fisticuffs and end up in an alleyway as the police arrive.  Candace and John 
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then examine Brandon’s face and inform him that he has a black eye.  Brandon smiles 
and examines his reflection proudly in a window.  Such an injury is physical proof that he 
was involved in a fight and aids in his masculine performance; he is delighted to have 
been involved in such a manly altercation and proud to have the black eye as evidence. 
After the bar brawl, he goes home with John and Candace, and his adventure in 
Falls City begins.  One night, he goes with John, Tom, Candace and Lana to a field where 
a group of people are “bumper skiing.”  They have tied a rope to the back of a truck and 
stand on the bumper as the vehicle speeds and turns, and the “skier” attempts to hold on.  
John jokingly pressures Brandon into taking part in the activity, warning everyone that 
Brandon is a “prize fighter” from Lincoln and laughingly saying that he is “tough, very 
tough.”  John’s reference to Brandon’s failed masculine display at the bar brawl in 
Lincoln propels him to bumper ski, which he does several times, each time falling 
painfully to the ground.  Later Lana asks him why he did such a stupid thing, and he 
replies, “I just thought that’s what guys do around here.”  Brandon openly wants to fit in 
with the other men in Falls City, and by bumper skiing he believes he is not only making 
up for his failure to win the bar fight but also behaving the way the other local men act.  
Both reasons reflect his desire to improve his masculine performance in order to pass as a 
man in Falls City. 
For Brandon, the need to pass is paramount because the consequences of 
detection are dire.  Early in the film, the brother of one of the girls Brandon has been 
dating discovers Brandon is biologically female.  A mob of men chase Brandon home, 
yelling homophobic slurs and threatening to kill him.  This scene, which foreshadows the 
end of the film when Brandon is discovered as female yet again, shows the dangerous 
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consequences of a failed gender performance and the necessity to keep his sex hidden.  In 
keeping with the theme of avoiding detection, much of the cinematography of the film is 
very dark, and most of the action takes place at night.  Brandon is often shown in dark 
settings such as bars or nightclubs, his face half hidden in the shadow.  His first sexual 
encounter with Lana is in a dark field in Falls City, and he is able to hide the fact that he 
is using a dildo through careful body positioning and his dark surroundings.  Just as Bree 
in Transamerica hid her face with large hats and sunglasses, much of the film shows 
Brandon in the dark, the low light helping to hide any femaleness he may have been 
unable to suppress. 
Conversely, the light is a place of discovery, or at least the fear of discovery.  One 
scene in particular highlights the fear associated with too close a gaze.  One morning 
Brandon, Lana and John are in Lana’s bright kitchen with her mother.  Brandon is 
explaining his (manufactured) family history and says that his sister is a model out in 
Hollywood.  Lana’s mom then commands, “Come over here closer where I can see you.”  
She is sitting next to a large, bright window and continues, “Let me look at you in the 
light.”  Brandon is visibly shaken and walks slowly over to Lana’s mom.  She takes his 
face in her hands and turns it towards the light as Brandon stands stiffly and 
uncomfortably next to her.  She closely examines his face for a few moments, but his 
performance passes; Lana’s mom declares he is very handsome and that she has no 
trouble believing his sister is a model.  But much like Bree’s discomfort with prolonged 
looks, this tense moment highlights the fear of detection transsexuals face and serves to 
categorize the daytime as a place of vulnerability and possible discovery. 
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Indeed, Brandon’s performance unravels because of several pivotal scenes that 
take place during the day.  After Brandon has been staying with her for a few weeks, 
Candace discovers Brandon has been forging checks in her name.  Concerned and angry, 
she searches his room for evidence of further wrongdoing.   She lifts the mattress and 
finds the tampon wrapper he hid.  She picks it up with a troubled look on her face and 
continues her search, next finding his jeans stained with menstrual blood.  Her confusion 
turns to horror as she sifts through the trash and finds a court summons for Teena 
Brandon, and she drops to her knees on the floor and weeps, wailing, “No!”  Candace’s 
tearful reaction underscores the deep-seated heteronormativity of American culture, and 
in particular rural American culture.  In contrast to Toby’s reaction in Transamerica in 
which he was principally angry at Bree not for her transsexuality but for the fact that she 
hid it, subsequent scenes make it clear that Brandon’s transgender lifestyle is the cause of 
Candace and the rest of the group’s ire.  John and Tom openly mock Brandon’s “gender 
identity crisis” and refer to him as a “dyke” once they discover he is biologically female.  
Therefore, Candace’s discovery sets Brandon’s downfall in motion and highlights the 
group’s discomfort with and intolerance for transsexuality. 
When Candace makes her discovery, Brandon is locked in jail.  He has a 
significant criminal past, and it finally catches up with him in Falls City.  When he goes 
to pay a traffic fine, the police discover his identification is false and he is really Teena 
Brandon.  He failed to appear in court on a previous charge so there is a warrant out for 
his arrest, and he is taken into custody and jailed.  Lana finds out and goes to visit him 
during the day, only to discover he is in the women’s cell.  She asks what is going on and 
he replies nervously that he is a hermaphrodite.  The camera pulls in tight on Lana as she 
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closes her eyes at the news.  Brandon falters, saying, “Brandon’s not quite a he. 
Brandon’s more like a…”  Lana cuts him off, saying, “Shut up.  It’s your business.  Look, 
I don’t care if you’re half monkey or half ape, I’m getting you out of here,” and reaches 
up to hold his hand through the bars.  Lana’s reaction stands in stark contrast to 
Candace’s behavior.  Although she is visibly surprised, closing her eyes as she processes 
the information, she is not horrified.  Instead she accepts him and allows him his privacy.  
She does not make him admit that he is female; instead she allows him to preserve his 
maleness, telling him to shut up before him can say it.  For Lana, Brandon’s identity and 
sexuality are a private, personal matter, and she cares for him regardless of his 
categorization. 
Indeed, in addition to the emphasis on Brandon’s gender performance and the 
complexity of the transgender body, the film focuses heavily on Lana’s perception of 
Brandon and develops her female gaze as a site of ambiguity.  The first scene that 
examines the power of Lana’s gaze is her first sex scene with Brandon.  Brandon 
convinces Lana to leave work early, and they talk and make love in a field near a body of 
water.  Lana is unaware that Brandon is not biologically male, and he makes love to her 
using a dildo.  While they are having sex, Lana looks up at Brandon and sees down his 
shirt.  From her point of view, the spectator sees Brandon’s bound breasts with a bit of 
cleavage showing.  At this point, the scene cuts abruptly away to a shot of Lana in her 
bedroom with two female friends who question her about the sexual encounter.  She 
stares blankly up at the ceiling, avoiding their questions.  The quick cut away to a silent 
Lana intimates that perhaps Lana knew all was not as it seemed with Brandon, and her 
continued actions both in the sex scene and the intercut scene in her bedroom support 
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such a reading.  After Lana climaxes, Brandon sits her up and asks twice, “Are you 
okay?”  Lana breathes heavily and looks around, disoriented. Finally she replies, “Yeah.  
I mean, I don’t know.”  She then reaches over to feel Brandon’s penis and her gaze 
flutters over his chest.  She goes on to examine his jawline, chin, and eyebrows – all parts 
of the face that tend to separate masculine features from feminine features – and 
concludes, “You’re so handsome.”  Despite her apparent doubts and unease, it seems as 
though Brandon’s gender performance passes inspection. 
However, the sequence then cuts back to the bedroom scene with her friends 
where she says, “And then we took off our clothes and went swimming.”  However, the 
spectator does not see this happen and can assume that it did not or Lana would have seen 
Brandon nude and known he was not biologically male.  Such a lie implies that Lana’s 
doubts lingered even after her examination of Brandon’s phallus and face.  Anxious to 
convince herself and her friends that Brandon’s body matched his gender performance, 
she pretends she has seen him fully nude.  Her evasiveness continues as her friend asks 
her point blank, “Did you do it?”  Lana replies, “What do ya think?” then squeals and 
jumps out of bed.  She never fully admits to having sex with Brandon, allowing her 
friends to fill in the blanks.  As Patricia White explains, “If we credit her with ‘knowing’ 
about Brandon’s gender performance, we might understand why she leaves the question’s 
presumptive ‘yes’ answer unspoken.”
138
 According to her friends’ and quite probably her 
own definition of “doing it,” if Lana suspects that Brandon might not be biologically 
male, their transgender encounter would not fit into the heteronormative parameters of 
sex.  By asking, “What do ya think?” she allows their imaginative assumptions to answer 
their own question, just as her fantasy allows her to accept Brandon’s maleness despite 
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evidence to the contrary.  This scene sets up Lana’s gaze, the female gaze, as one that 
does not have to see to believe, eschewing the traditional emphasis on genitalia as the 
indicator of one’s “true” sex. 
Lana’s gaze continues to be defined throughout the film as one that sees not the 
physical body but rather accepts Brandon’s gender performance. Lana’s friends and 
family, including Brandon’s eventual murderers, John and Tom, suspect Brandon has lied 
about his sex after he is arrested and his name appears in the police blotter as Teena 
Brandon.  They violently accost Brandon in Lana’s home, demanding that he strip and 
prove he is really a man.  Lana rushes in to help him, asking John and Tom to trust her to 
see Brandon naked and report back to them.  Shaken, Lana and Brandon go into her 
bedroom.  Brandon starts to unbutton his pants and stammeringly tries to explain his 
situation, but Lana says, “Button up your pants; you’re not showing me anything. Think 
about it. I know you’re a guy.”  This scene echoes the previous scene in Lana’s bedroom 
where she and her friends discuss her sexual encounter with Brandon.  Again, she 
ultimately leaves the question unanswered, instead allowing the presumed answer to 
remain only in their minds.  Just as she responds, “What do ya think?” to her friends’ 
pressing questions about her actions with Brandon, so she commands Brandon to “think 
about” how she knows he must be male rather than show her.  As Judith Halberstam 
explains, this further defines Lana’s female gaze “as a willingness to see what is not there 
(a condition of all fantasy) but also a refusal to privilege the literal over the figurative 
(Brandon’s genitalia over Brandon’s gender presentation).”
139
  Just as she did in the jail 
scene in which she cut Brandon off before he could admit that he was female, she again 
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allows the “fantasy” of Brandon’s gender performance to outweigh his physical body, 




Brandon continues to try to justify himself, telling her of his “birth defect.” Lana 
brushes him off, replying, “I have weird stuff, too. Don’t be scared.”  This statement 
normalizes Brandon’s transgenderism. She empathizes with him, explaining that she has 
issues that make her unique as well.  Rather than allowing his attempted admission of his 
“true” sex, which she may already suspect, to throw her, she classifies it as one of the 
many different types of physical and emotional abnormalities that all people have.  
Brandon then sits on the bed next to her and asks, “So what are you gonna tell them?”  
She answers, “I’m gonna tell them what they wanna hear. I’m gonna tell them what I 
know is true.”  Again, Lana’s gaze is based upon the “fantasy” of Brandon’s gender 
performance rather than his anatomical sex.  She averts her gaze away from his body, 
refusing to look at him, and accepts what she “thinks” and “knows” to be true based upon 
her interactions with Brandon.  Furthermore, she plans to share that fantasy with John and 
Tom, hoping that they, too, will be willing to rely not on their sight but upon their belief 
as she tells them “what they wanna hear.” 
Brandon and Lana then exit the safe confines of her bedroom where the female 
gaze reigned, reentering the dangerous space of the living room.  Lana tells John, Tom, 
and the rest of her friends and family, “I seen him in the full flesh. I seen it. I know he’s a 
man.”  Again, she lies to preserve Brandon’s performance just as she lied to her friends, 
padding her story of their lovemaking with the detail that they swam together.  But here 
her lie explicitly marks his flesh as male as she claims to have seen “it,” which is 
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presumably his penis.  Unwilling to castrate him, she takes again what she “thinks” and 
“knows” and allows his flesh to mirror it.  Rather than traditional sex/gender binaries in 
which the performed gender is expected to follow the biologically given sex, Lana 
reverses the polarity.  She allows his performance to mark his body as male rather than 
allowing his body to mark his gender performance as incongruous. 
However, Lana’s family and friends are not as trusting as she had hoped.  Her 
mother slams Brandon against the wall, demanding to know the truth.  John and Tom 
then decide to do as they had originally wished and strip Brandon.  They drag him into 
the bathroom, holding him against the wall with his hands above his head and pull his 
pants down.  Brandon shouts for them to stop and covers then closes his eyes as they 
undress him.  He attempts to shut off his own gaze, his own knowledge of his biological 
sex and attendant castration.  John and Tom are unsurprised but disgusted when they find 
Brandon to be female.  Thus the film, as Halberstam notes, “identifies the male gaze with 
that form of knowledge which resides in the literal.”
141
  The male gaze is that of science, 
reason and biological fact.  Unlike Lana’s gaze, which holds to fantasy and forces 
Brandon’s body to conform in her mind to his gendered performance, the violent male 
gaze sees that Brandon’s gender performance does not coincide with his biological sex, 
and the men are outraged. 
They call Lana into the bathroom and yell for her to look at Brandon.  She, like 
Brandon, covers and closes her eyes, unwilling to castrate him by adopting the male gaze.  
The men force her to kneel before Brandon and open her eyes.  As Tom holds her face in 
front of Brandon’s crotch, the action momentarily stills as Brandon, nude from the waist 
down and helpless, looks out into the hallway and sees a fully-clothed Brandon staring 
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back.  As Halberstam explains, “…this shot/reverse-shot involving the two Brandons 
now serves both to destabilize the spectator’s sense of gender stability and also to 
confirm Brandon’s manhood at the very moment that he has been exposed as 
female/castrated.”
142
  Such a split reflects the transgender gaze, “a look divided within 
itself,” and here acknowledges both Brandon’s female-sexed body and his masculine 
gender performance.
143
  Lana’s female gaze seems to adopt such a divided look as well, 
for even as Tom holds her face before Brandon’s vagina, she screams, “Leave him 
alone!” (emphasis added).  Although she is forced to look upon Brandon’s naked body as 
the men try to force her to adopt their male gaze, she refuses, retaining her female gaze 
which accepts Brandon’s gender performance as “truth.”  Lana adopts the transgender 
gaze, looking at the castrated Brandon before her but seeing, in her mind’s eye, the 
masculine Brandon who gazes back at them from the hallway. 
After Brandon is castrated and humiliated, John and Tom take him out into the 
country and brutally rape him.  They return to town and Brandon escapes, hiding in a 
shed.  Lana comes and finds him huddled and shaking on a couch, beginning undoubtedly 
the most controversial scene for feminist and queer critics.  She joins him on the couch 
and looks at him, touching his face.  “You’re so pretty,” she concludes, revising her 
earlier declaration that he was “so handsome.”  She then asks, “What were you like 
before all this? Were you like me, like a girl girl?”  Brandon replies, “I guess, like a long 
time ago. And then I was just like a boy girl.”  They kiss, and Lana stammers, “I don’t 
know if I’m gonna know how to do…” Brandon reassures her, and the camera fades as 
they begin to make love. 
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The scene is undeniably problematic, and it is no surprise that it has caused 
dissension and anger amongst critics.  It is illogical and even offensive to assume that 
Brandon would wish to make love so soon after the brutal bathroom scene and his 
subsequent double rape.  Many rape victims struggle for years to regain a healthy, normal 
sex life, and the assumption that Brandon is easily able to have sex with Lana so soon is 
ludicrous.  While the scene could be read as a recovery of sex, a recoloring of the act as 
beautiful rather than horrific, its timing is disturbing.  Moreover, many critics find fault 
with what they see as Brandon’s being “humanistically recovered by the script into a love 
that not-so-humanistically refuses the masculine gender he has struggled to become.”
144
  
Halberstam in particular claims that the film reduces its transgender message by 
reconfiguring Brandon as a woman: 
In many ways the encounter that follows seems to extend the violence enacted 
upon Brandon’s body by John and Tom, since Brandon now interacts with Lana 
as if he were a woman.  Lana, contrary to her previous commitment to his 
masculinity, seems to see him as a female, calling him ‘pretty’ and asking him 
what he was like as a girl. . .‘Truth’ here becomes sutured to nakedness. . . [The 
film] pulls back from its commitment to [Brandon’s] masculinity here by 
allowing his femaleness to become legible and significant to Lana’s desire.
145
 
Halberstam reads Lana’s curious probing about Brandon’s past as Teena as well 
as her declaration that he is pretty rather than handsome as her acceptance of his 
femaleness. Such a reading of the scene is valid.  Lana’s description of Brandon as 
“pretty” reconfigures him as at least somewhat feminine in direct contrast to her earlier 
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assertion of his masculinity when she calls him handsome after their first sexual 
encounter.  However, all other references to his femaleness and/or femininity are in the 
past tense; she acknowledges that he was female and possibly feminine “before all this,” 
with “this” presumably referring to his transgender life as a man and inquires, “Were you 
like me?”  While the “pretty” comment risks the negation of Brandon’s masculinity, her 
questions about his past as a girl show an acknowledgment that things have changed and 
he is no longer like her, which is to say female.  Therefore, her recognition of his past 
femininity and current female genitalia does not necessarily negate his masculinity; rather 
it reflects the complex nature of the transgender body. 
However, in keeping with a reading that sees Brandon reconfigured as female, 
Brandon and Lana’s relationship changes as well.  Indeed, Henderson argues that Lana’s 
comment, “I don’t know if I’m gonna know how to…” cements the lesbian nature of their 
relationship, saying: 
It is her first declaration of sexual inexperience (despite earlier love scenes), and 
thus becomes a self-conscious reference to the specifically lesbian sex Lana has 
never had but is about to, with Brandon as a girl.  Maddeningly, the scene affirms 
what Brandon’s rapists had imposed. . .- that Brandon is female.
146
 
Both Halberstam and Henderson claim that the film not only disavows Brandon’s 
masculinity by reconfiguring him as feminine, but that it also replaces his transgender 
sexual relationship with Lana with a less controversial lesbian relationship. Henderson 
points specifically to Lana’s trepidation at pleasuring Brandon as the film’s 
acknowledgment of his femaleness, echoing Halberstam’s  analysis that the film loses 
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some of its transgressive grit by “allowing [Brandon’s] femaleness to become legible and 
significant to Lana’s desire.” 
147
 
However, such an interpretation ignores the complexity of the transgender 
subject.  Lana is not necessarily nervous to interact sexually with Brandon, as Halberstam 
says, “as if he were a woman.”
148
  Lana is expressing her trepidation and inexperience 
pleasuring female genitalia; such a fact does not necessarily mean that she is ignoring his 
masculine gender, as Henderson claims, but only that she is acknowledging that Brandon 
has a vagina.
149
  As previously stated, all references Lana makes to Brandon’s lived 
experiences as a female and his femininity are in the past tense, and she recognizes that 
his feminine gender performance has been replaced by masculinity (i.e. “Were you a girl 
girl. . .before all this?”).  In keep with her reading of this sexual encounter as lesbian, 
Henderson goes on to argue that:  
[Brandon] finally becomes a transitional body made violently accountable to a 
gender binarism which permits no alternative embodiment or subjectivity, 
demanding instead that both one’s body and claims about one’s self conform to 




In other words, Henderson argues that Lana’s acceptance of Brandon’s female genitalia 
forces her to see him as feminine; but this is unclear from Lana’s words and actions, and 
to ignore the continued transgender aspects of their sexual relationship is ironically, as 
Henderson said, to make Brandon “accountable to a gender binarism which permits no 
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alternative embodiment.”  Lana has openly acknowledged Brandon’s transgenderism 
where before she perhaps only suspected it; such recognition does not necessarily replace 
her female gaze with that of the male gaze, insistent on biological fact as truth.  It does 
not, in other words, create a lesbian relationship but rather a more explicitly transgender 
sexual encounter.   
Brenda Cooper presents a similar reading of the scene, concluding, “the film’s 
narratives make it possible to read Lana’s behavior as more ambiguous” than Halberstam 
and Henderson claim “and, ultimately, as far more liberatory. . . The ambiguity of Lana’s 
attraction to Brandon as a man on one hand, and her acknowledgment and acceptance of 
his biological sex on the other hand, subvert heteroideology and its inherent oppression of 
sexual difference.”
151
  Notably, in contrast to the previous sex scene between Lana and 
Brandon in which Brandon used the dildo, the spectator is not privy to this sexual 
encounter.  As they begin to kiss on the couch, the camera pans up and fades out.  
Therefore, the only sex scene the spectator sees in full is between Brandon “as a man” 
and Lana; the fade-out prevents their relationship from being explicitly rendered lesbian.  
Furthermore, through Lana’s recognition of Brandon’s female genitalia, Brandon can 
now receive pleasure from sex in a way he could not previously.  Metaphorically, just as 
in the bathroom scene, there are two Brandons.  There is the castrated Brandon, his lack 
of a phallus made visible now through sex with Lana, and there is the masculine 
Brandon, his gender performance intact.  Lana seems to embrace both Brandons at once.  
As a result of her acknowledgment of Brandon’s female body but not her disavowal of 
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his masculine gender, as well as the spectator’s lack of access to their final sexual 
encounter, their relationship remains complex and transgender. 
Overall, the film encourages the spectator to eschew the traditional male gaze in 
favor of more open female and transgender gazes.  Brandon’s masculine appearance and 
behavior highlights the performativity of gender as well as the power of the gaze.  There 
are serious consequences for a failed performance, and because the other characters do 
not know Brandon is transgender during most of the film, the spectator’s awareness of 
Brandon’s performativity and his need to avoid detection are heightened.  Furthermore, 
through Lana’s eyes, the spectator comes to view Brandon as a complex transgender 
man.  Although the final sex scene between Brandon and Lana is problematic, it does not 
serve to undermine the film’s message about transgender embodiment and the validity of 
Brandon’s gender performance.  It does not replace Lana’s female gaze with the male 
gaze, which insists upon the unalienable “truth” of biological sex, rendering Brandon 
female.  Rather it reflects the complexity of Brandon’s situation and serves to meld the 
two Brandons – the castrated Brandon and the masculine Brandon – into one.   
*** 
 The Birdcage, Victor/Victoria, Transamerica, and Boys Don’t Cry allow the 
spectator a way out of strictly gendered spectatorial positions.  The presence of 
atypically-gendered characters, be they drag queens, pseudo-drag queens, transgender or 
transsexual people, disrupts the spectators’ ability to identify with, fetishize or objectify 
the main characters unproblematically.  Through its use of camp and parody, The 
Birdcage foregrounds the performative nature of gender and renders it and conservative, 
hegemonic ideology ludicrous.  The many drag performances in Victor/Victoria similarly 
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expose gender as a set of tropes and behaviors rather than as natural, but the film 
ultimately allows the male gaze to reign.  Bree and Toby’s relationship in Transamerica 
goes beyond disrupting gendered theories of spectatorship by disrupting the very Oedipal 
base of those theories.  And Boys Don’t Cry preserves the power of the female and 
transgender gazes, allowing the spectator to see the complexity of the transgender body.  
Overall these films allow for individualized gazes that are not dependent upon the sex or 
gender of the spectator but rather on each spectator as an individual. 
